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DANGEROUS PRECEDENT:   
AMERICA’S ILLEGAL WAR IN AFGHANISTAN 
BY RYAN T. WILLIAMS*  
ABSTRACT 
Osama bin Laden’s death has led many to question the efficacy 
of America’s continued fighting in Afghanistan.  Too often 
dismissed is any meaningful discussion of the legality of the war 
on terror in Afghanistan, where the United States has promised to 
keep fighting until at least 2014.  The use of force in international 
law is generally forbidden, except under three circumstances:  in 
self-defense, pursuant to a United Nations Security Council 
resolution, or with consent from the leader of an invaded state.  
After a careful examination of all three, it is apparent that 
America’s continued fighting in Afghanistan, more than a decade 
after 9/11, does not fall under any category.  By continuing to fight 
this illegal war, America loses a significant amount of moral high 
ground and tangible international leverage.  Worse still, by relying 
on an illegitimate leader’s consent as justification for the war, 
America unwittingly establishes a precarious blueprint for future 
states to follow.  Whatever sound (or unsound) reasons America 
has for continuing the war, its illegality foreshadows a more 
dangerous future. 
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“The post-Cold War era . . . began with the collapse of one structure, the 
Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989, and ended with the collapse of another, 
the World Trade Center’s twin towers on September 11, 2001.”1 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
On September 11, 2001 the United States was attacked when 
terrorists hijacked planes and flew them into the World Trade 
Center and the Pentagon.  Nearly 3,000 Americans died, most of 
 
1 John Lewis Gaddis, And Now This: Lessons from the Old Era for the New One, 
in THE AGE OF TERROR: AMERICA AND THE WORLD AFTER SEPTEMBER 11, at 1, 3 (Strobe 
Talbott & Nayan Chanda, eds., 2001). 
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whom were civilians.2  Although members of the terrorist group al 
Qaeda claimed responsibility for the attacks and the United States 
believed them,3 the brutality and suddenness of the attacks left the 
United States scrambling. 
A month later, the United States launched Operation Enduring 
Freedom (OEF), which was designed to destroy the presence of al 
Qaeda in Afghanistan.  At that time, the Taliban—a group of un-
recognized, illegitimate drug lords—was the de facto ruler of 
Afghanistan.  Thus, the initial question was whether the United 
States could also fight and kill the Taliban for harboring or aiding 
al Qaeda.  In the ensuing decade, America waged war in 
Afghanistan against the Taliban, long after al Qaeda had left the 
region.  The question has subsequently changed.  Can America 
legally continue fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan, more than ten 
years after al Qaeda attacked America?  This Article will not debate 
the merits of remaining in Afghanistan, or the downsides of a 
troop withdrawal, both of which are many.  Instead, it will focus 
on the more overlooked question:  this conflict’s legality.  “The 
existing law does not address when a state may take pre-emptive 
or anticipatory action against a non-state actor, and thus does not 
provide an actionable guideline for modern-day armed conflict.”4  
This Article will show that even if America’s initial involvement in 
Afghanistan arguably comported with international law, its 
continued military activity more than a decade later does not 
comport with any existing international law regarding the use of 
force. 
Over the past decade, numerous events have contributed to 
this new reality.  The most recent event occurred on April 30, 2011, 
when American forces, without knowledge or permission from the 
Pakistani government, infiltrated the Pakistani border and killed al 
 
2 See Stephen M. Walt, Why They Hate Us (II): How Many Muslims Has the U.S. 
Killed in the Past 30 Years?, FOREIGN POL’Y, Nov. 30, 2009, 
http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/11/30/why_they_hate_us_ii_how 
_many_muslims_has_the_us_killed_in_the_past_30_years (providing an 
overview of the deaths attributable to United States/Muslim conflict).  
3 See Tony Karon, Eight Years After 9/11: Why Osama bin Laden Failed, TIME, 
Sept. 11, 2009, http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599 
,1921758,00.html (noting that Osama bin Laden of al Qaeda claimed responsibility 
for the attacks).  
4 Amos N. Guiora, Anticipatory Self-Defence and International Law—a Re-
Evaluation, 13 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 3, 15 (2008). 
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Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden.5  In the wake of bin Laden’s death, 
President Obama announced that the United States would begin 
withdrawing troops from Afghanistan.6 
The plan calls for approximately 30,000 troops to return to the 
United States by the end of 2012.7  The President announced this 
great troop reduction as a direct result of bin Laden’s death.  
Apparently, since al Qaeda’s leader was killed in Pakistan, the 
United States could reduce its fighting of the Taliban in 
Afghanistan.  This nonsensical logic and decision making 
highlights one of the fundamental problems with the legality of 
America’s continued war in Afghanistan. 
Since 1949, the United Nations Charter has provided the legal 
guidelines governing the use of force in international law.  Under 
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, member states are prohibited from 
any use of force that threatens the territorial integrity of political 
independence of any state.  This broad threshold against the use of 
force has three main exceptions:  A state may resort to force (1) in 
self-defense, (2) pursuant to a U.N. Security Council resolution, or 
(3) with the consent from the leader of the host state.  At various 
times throughout the war, America has claimed that its use of force 
in Afghanistan falls under all three exceptions, and as such, all 
three will be examined in this Article. 
The most relatable justification to the general public appears to 
be self-defense.  There is little doubt America was attacked on 9/11 
 
5 See Scott Wilson et al., Osama bin Laden Killed in U.S. Raid, Buried at Sea, 
WASH. POST, May 2, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/osama-
bin-laden-killed-in-us-raid-buried-at-sea/2011/05/02/AFx0yAZF_story.html 
(detailing the U.S. raid which led to bin Laden’s killing).  
6 See Jim Sciutto et al., Obama Orders Start to US Troop Withdrawal From 
Afghanistan, ABC NEWS (June 22, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics 
/president-obama-orders-start-us-troop-withdrawal-afghanistan/story?id 
=13908291 (noting President Obama’s pledge to withdraw 10,000 U.S. troops by 
the end of 2011, and 23,000 by the summer of 2012). 
7 Id.  The withdrawal plan was celebrated as America leaving Afghanistan.  
In actuality though, the 2012 withdrawal does not eliminate the American 
presence in Afghanistan.  Indeed, President Obama has more than tripled the 
number of troops in Afghanistan since he took office.  Id.  The 2012 withdrawal 
actually only manages to bring the total number of troops to around 70,000, which 
is still about double the number of troops that were present when President 
Obama took office in 2009.  See Press Release, President Barack Obama, Remarks 
by the President in Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan 
and Pakistan (Dec. 1, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/remarks-president-address-nation-way-forward-afghanistan-and-pakistan 
(announcing the deployment of 30,000 troops to Afghanistan). 
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and the perpetrators were members of al Qaeda.  But, bin Laden’s 
death and the subsequent troop withdrawal raise some concerns 
about the viability of self-defense as a legal justification for the war 
in Afghanistan.  If America begins withdrawing from Afghanistan 
because the leader of al Qaeda was shot and killed in Pakistan, 
how was (and is) the war against the Taliban in Afghanistan self-
defense against al Qaeda? 
This Article will also examine why the other two potential 
international law exceptions that would allow for U.S. military 
force do not apply.  Outside self-defense, states can use military 
force pursuant to a U.N. Security Council resolution.  However, 
there is no U.N. Security Council resolution authorizing the use of 
force in Afghanistan.  The third exception for the use of force is 
consent.  This Article will focus on the consent issue in 
Afghanistan, and more specifically, the requisite legitimacy of a 
leader necessary to satisfy the consent requirement resulting in a 
legal use of force.  Traditionally, this determination occurs at the 
outset of the hostilities.  However, it can also apply in an ongoing 
context where force is greatly escalated, such as the American 
situation in Afghanistan over the past decade.  Here, Afghanistan’s 
President Hamid Karzai lacks authority and control over large 
parts of Afghanistan.8  The issue is whether an individual who 
does not have control over a nation, and never did, can authorize 
another country to make war in that nation for more than a decade. 
After exploring the exceptions with regard to America’s 
escalation of military force and promised continued military 
involvement in Afghanistan until years after bin Laden’s death, the 
conclusion is that America’s behavior is most likely illegal under 
international law.  The import of such a finding is great.  America’s 
persistence to fight an illegal war of this nature—a war neither 
based on self-defense, authorized by the U.N., nor fought under 
the consent of a legitimate leader—establishes a dangerous 
precedent.  State A could prop up a leader in a country B, one who 
 
8 See Grant T. Harris, The Era of Multilateral Occupation, 24 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 
1, 49 (2006) (stating that Hamid Karzai was the Chairman of the Interim 
Authority, whose power was often “circumscribed” and of little effect outside the 
capital city); Harold Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 
1479, 1489 (2003) (noting that even though Karzai “nominally acts as president,” 
much of Afghanistan still remains under control by warlords and drug lords); 
Panel Discussion, Building the Institutions of the Nation, 33 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 
171, 182 (2004) (stating that the authority of Hamid Karzai was “still being 
challenged” at the time of the 2004 panel discussion). 
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has no authority outside of the support from State A, and then 
State A could proceed to invade and fight a war for more than a 
decade based on that leader’s supposed authority.  One does not 
have to look far to see the problematic nature of setting such a 
precedent, with countries like China and Iran growing in stature 
and importance.  This paradigm for fighting terrorism is not one 
that will maintain international peace and security in the long 
term.  Quite the opposite is true, as it will likely encourage states to 
make war in whatever country they desire, under the consent of 
supposed leaders they prop up there. 
Furthermore, the increase in terrorism against the West by 
global and mobile radical jihadists has ensured that the prolonged 
conflict in Afghanistan is likely to arise with more frequency in the 
future.9  As such, this problem is unlikely to dissipate in the near 
future, but rather will be an increasing phenomenon as states that 
desire to combat terrorism attempt to legitimize their actions by 
utilizing the consent doctrine.  The consent doctrine will likely be 
the biggest lure for legitimacy because the other two main 
justifications for the use force are functionally more problematic. 
For example, self-defense, as will be explained in greater detail 
later, has specific requirements under international law, including 
that resort to the use of force must be necessary and proportional 
to the harm or threat of future harm.  As individuals continue to 
engage in terrorism—as opposed to acting within state sponsored 
armies—the traditional laws governing self-defense become more 
difficult to apply.  Moreover, the other legal way to use force—
acting pursuant to a Security Council resolution—is equally 
problematic.  For a variety of reasons, including the need for 
unanimous permanent member approval, the Security Council 
 
9 See Audrey Kurth Cronin, Sources of Contemporary Terrorism, in ATTACKING 
TERRORISM: ELEMENTS OF A GRAND STRATEGY 19, 37 (Audrey Kurth Cronin & James 
M. Ludes eds., 2004) (noting that threats across state borders may be “newly 
threatening”).  Indeed, the new terrorist structures are:  
less dependent on internal organizational dynamics to perpetuate 
themselves and their activities and more characterized by decentralized 
designs with stand-alone groups that are only loosely transnationally 
connected . . . .  
. . . 
[C]omponent cells that operate independently are much more difficult to 
eliminate; destroying the leadership has limited effect on the health of 
the overall organization. 
Id. at 28–29. 
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rarely articulates resolutions authorizing the use of force.  Indeed, 
one purpose of the United Nations is “to save succeeding 
generations from the scourge of war.”10  All member states are 
supposed to “settle their international disputes by peaceful 
means.”11 
Thus, without self-defense to rely upon or a Security Council 
resolution, states wishing to invade other states to root out terrorist 
threats will have only one primary recourse to use force:  the 
consent from the leader of the would-be invaded state.  By 
propping up an illegitimate leader in order to continuously achieve 
consent, America has negligently established a dangerous 
precedent for future unauthorized military actions. 
2. INTERNATIONAL LAW REGARDING THE USE OF FORCE 
The rules governing the use of force in international relations 
have remained relatively constant since their codification in the 
U.N. Charter in 1945.  The U.N. Charter, entered into by 198 
member states, lists as its primary goal to “maintain international 
peace and security, and to that end . . . [engage in] the suppression 
of acts of aggression.”12  Also, “the paramount importance of the 
Charter of the United Nations” includes “promotion of the rule of 
law among nations.”13 
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter states that no member state 
may use armed force that threatens the “territorial integrity or 
political independence of any state.”14  This statement’s placement 
within the second article of the U.N. Charter underscores the 
importance of the overall goal of the U.N. to limit the use of armed 
force in international relations.15  A member state may only use 
armed force for peacekeeping and other activities not threatening 
the territorial integrity or political independence of a state. 
 
10 U.N. Charter, pmbl. 
11 Id. art. 2, para. 3. 
12 Id. art. 1, para. 1. 
13 G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), Annex, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. 
Doc. A/5217, at 122 (Oct. 24, 1970).  G.A. Res. 2625 is the Declaration on Principles 
of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation Among 
States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. 
14 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4. 
15 See Edward Gordon, Article 2(4) in Historical Context, 10 YALE J. INT’L L. 271, 
278 (1985) (noting the “primary position” of Article 2(4) in the U.N. Charter). 
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In this sense, Article 2(4) is a prohibitive law, stating that the 
use of force cannot be utilized if it rises to a certain standard.  By 
contrast, then, it has been argued that if the use of force falls below 
this Article 2(4) threshold—in that it does not threaten the 
territorial integrity of political independence of another state—then 
the use of force is justified under international law.16  Thus, the 
United States could possibly apply this logic to justify its military 
invasion of Afghanistan—assuming it falls below the threshold of 
unallowable uses of force. 
This, however, is not the case.  The U.S. led invasion of 
Afghanistan in October 2001 was initiated precisely to threaten 
territorial integrity and political independence of Afghanistan.  The 
United States did not respect the Taliban government’s wishes:  
When the Taliban asked for proof that al Qaeda was there, the 
United States provided none.17  Because the United States wanted 
to overthrow the Taliban government and kill various suspected 
terrorists in their country,18 the United States could not look to 
Article 2(4) as legal justification of its war in Afghanistan.  Even if 
it could, however, America’s continued war against the Taliban a 
decade later is a clear violation of Article 2(4). 
In order to determine if America’s continued involvement in 
Afghanistan against the Taliban is in any way legal under 
international law, a review of the list of possible legal uses of force, 
or exceptions to Article 2(4), is instructive. 
2.1. Self-Defense 
There are two main legal bases for self-defense in international 
law:  historic international law and the U.N. Charter.  Before 
discussing either, it is important to understand the nature of the 
enemy in Afghanistan and how it has evolved over time. 
 
16 See JOHN NORTON MOORE & ROBERT F. TURNER, NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 55 
(2d ed. 2005) (discussing the U.N. Charter and the permissibility for the use of 
force).  
17 See Jonathan I. Charney, Editorial Comment, The Use of Force Against 
Terrorism and International Law, 95 AM. J. INT’L. L. 835, 836–37 (2001) (exploring the 
United States’ self defense justification for its actions in Afghanistan). 
18 See DONALD P. WRIGHT ET AL., A DIFFERENT KIND OF WAR: THE UNITED 
STATES ARMY IN OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM OCTOBER 2001–SEPTEMBER 2005, at 
27 (2010) (detailing the initial objectives of Operation Enduring Freedom, 
including “to eliminate Osama bin Laden and his terrorist group, al-Qaeda, and to 
take down the ruling Taliban regime that harbored these terrorists”). 
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2.1.1.  al Qaeda is Not the Taliban 
Any basic understanding of self-defense is based on the 
premise of defense against the attacker.  Someone who is being 
injured by a member of the New York Giants football team does 
not then exact self-defense by injuring every member of the Boston 
Red Sox baseball team.  Not only are they not from the same team, 
they are in a different sport.  The former Taliban government of 
Afghanistan was not only comprised of a different group of people 
than al Qaeda, but they were also a different type, as they were the 
government of a state.  Members of al Qaeda know no borders and 
are bonded by a message of hatred of a singular enemy (the West), 
and not by territory, like the Taliban.19  Mainstream media and the 
general public often fail to realize one key distinction regarding 
America’s recent involvement in Afghanistan:  Namely, the fight is 
no longer against those who claimed responsibility for 9/11 (if it 
ever was).  The current war is against the Taliban—not al Qaeda.20 
It is generally (though not universally) accepted within the 
international community that in the beginning, October 2001, the 
Taliban was sufficiently intertwined with al Qaeda to warrant 
America’s self-defense against both actors as a result of 9/11.21  
Yet, it was al Qaeda who was responsible for the 9/11 attacks.  This 
raises an important question:  can a state invade another state, 
claiming self-defense, if that state never attacked it?  What if a state 
only harbors a group responsible for attacks?  More relevant in the 
current climate, can an invading state claim self-defense 
indefinitely against a state that used to harbor terrorists over a 
decade ago?  In other words, is there a statute of limitations on self-
 
19 See Audrey Kurth Cronin, Introduction: Meeting and Managing the Threat, in 
ATTACKING TERRORISM, supra note 9, at 1, 2 (“There is evidence that al-Qaeda has 
evolved into a more decentralized, franchised organization, with less direct 
control over its cells but more connections with other groups and an increasing 
convergence of formerly distinct causes.”). 
20 See Lee Ferran, President Karzai: War on Terror Against al Qaeda Not in 
Afghanistan, Election Was ‘Good and Fair’, ABC NEWS (Oct. 13, 2009), 
http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/Afghanistan/afghan-president-hamid-karzai-
speaks-diane-sawyer/story?id=8812586 (noting that al Qaeda was thrown out of 
the country in 2001, according to Afghan President Hamid Karzai, and thus 
implying that the fight in Afghanistan is no longer against al Qaeda). 
21 Cf. Mary Ellen O’Connell, Lawful Self-Defense to Terrorism, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 
889, 904 (2002) (noting that “Operation Enduring Freedom properly aimed at 
eliminating the military capacity of the Taliban and al Qaeda” but that 
“[e]liminating the whole government structure created by the Taliban, as a war 
aim was beyond necessary self-defense”). 
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defense for merely harboring and does it end at some point after 
those offending individuals have left the invaded state? 
International law provides only some clarity:  “a state will be 
responsible if it sends persons to carry out an attack, adopts the 
acts of the group after the fact, or develops sufficiently close links 
with a terrorist group.”22  
2.1.1.1.  Case Example No. 1:  Nicaragua v. United States 
The present situation in Afghanistan has (correctly) drawn 
comparisons to the Nicaraguan situation of the mid-1980s.  In fact, 
“the Nicaragua case is the touchstone for much modern analysis of 
the concept of self-defense.”23  In 1986, Nicaragua sued the United 
States, claim that it was liable for the actions of the Contras against 
the Sandinista government in Nicaragua.  Specifically, Nicaragua 
claimed that “by funding, equipping, supplying, and training the 
Contras, who then carried out attacks within Nicaragua, the US 
had illegally used force against Nicaragua and was responsible for 
all the actions of the Contras.”24 
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) rejected Nicaragua’s 
claim that the United States was responsible for the Contras’ 
actions because “to give rise to legal responsibility of the United 
States, it would in principle have to be proved that that State had 
effective control of the military or paramilitary operations in the 
course of which the alleged violations were committed.”25  In short, 
because the United States did not exercise “effective control” over 
the Contra rebels fighting in Nicaragua, the ICJ held that the 
actions of those rebels were not attributable to the United States.26  
More specifically, the ICJ held that “the mere ‘assistance to rebels 
in the form of provision of weapons or logistical or other support’ 
 
22 Mary Ellen O’Connell, Enhancing the Status of Non-State Actors Through a 
Global War on Terror?, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 435, 448–49 (2005) (citing G.A. 
Res. 3314 (XXIX), Annex, art. 3, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No.19, U.N. Doc. 
A/9619, at 143 (Dec. 14, 1974)).  
23 THOMAS MICHAEL MCDONNELL, THE UNITED STATES, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
AND THE STRUGGLE AGAINST TERRORISM 261 (2010). 
24 Id. 
25 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. 
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 115 (June 27). 
26 See id. (concluding that the actions of Contra rebels could not be attributed 
to the United States even if it was “preponderant or decisive, in the financing, 
organizing, training, supplying and equipping of the contras, the selection of its 
military or paramilitary targets, and the planning of the whole of its operation”).  
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was explicitly denied the effect of attributing the responsibility for 
private operations to a particular state.”27 
“Under that standard, the attack on the World Trade Center 
and the Pentagon can hardly be qualified as an armed attack on the 
part of Afghanistan against the United States.”28  Thus, using 
effective control as the test, the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, to kill 
the Taliban for aiding and harboring al Qaeda, is not a legal self-
defense.  “A strict reading of Nicaragua suggests that under the 
publically available evidence[,] the Taliban did not[,] on either 11 
September 2001 or on 7 October 2001 ‘effectively control’ al 
Qaeda.”29  As such, though the international community appears to 
accept that the Taliban was initially in some way responsible for 
the actions of al Qaeda, it is far from clear that the Taliban 
“effectively controlled” al Qaeda.  There may have been 
coordination, joint financing efforts, and harboring, but not 
necessarily “effective control.”30 
2.1.1.2.  Case Example No. 2: Prosecutor v. Tadic 
Nine years after the Nicaragua case, “the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) . . . developed 
a new test of attribution—one with a significantly lower threshold 
than ‘effective control.’”31  In Prosecutor v. Tadic, the ICTY had to 
decide whether the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was 
“responsible for the acts of its former soldiers and the military 
force after they had formed in a neighboring emerging state 
 
27  Karl M. Meessen, Unilateral Recourse to Military Force Against Terrorist 
Attacks, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 341, 345 (2003) (quoting Military and Paramilitary 
Activities, 1986 I.C.J. at 104).  
28 Id.  
29 MCDONNELL, supra note 23, at 263 (finding little evidence that the Taliban 
directly funded or equipped, let alone issued orders to al Qaeda); see also United 
States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 91 
(May 24) (holding that Iran could be liable for injuries incurred by the United 
States resulting from hostage-taking at the U.S. Embassy).  U.S. v. Iran intimates 
that a state may be legally responsible for actions of individual attackers if it 
“adopts” the acts of the attackers.  There, Iran was responsible for hostage-taking 
militants’ actions because of the “failure on the part of the Iranian authorities to 
oppose the armed attack by militants . . .  and . . . the almost immediate 
endorsement by those authorities of the situation thus created . . . .”  Id. 
30 See Mary Ellen O’Connell, Re-Leashing the Dogs of War, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 
446, 451–52 (2003) (book review) (acknowledging that the Taliban’s and al 
Qaeda’s activities might have “coordinated or intertwined” and the effective 
control test could be met if al Qaeda or the Taliban gave one another orders). 
31 O’Connell, supra note 22, at 449. 
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(Bosnia), which broke off or seceded from the original state 
[Yugoslavia].”32 
 The ICTY determined: 
The control required by international law may be deemed 
to exist when a State (or, in the context of an armed conflict, 
the Party to the conflict) has a role in organising, coordinating 
or planning the military actions of the military group, in 
addition to financing, training and equipping or providing 
operational support to that group.33 
The ICTY thus established an alternative attribution standard to 
that in Nicaragua.34 
Yet it is unclear that the Taliban made Afghanistan liable even 
under the Tadic standard.  There is no specific information that the 
Taliban directly funded al Qaeda or provided them with training, 
weapons, or supplies.35  If the Taliban only harbored al Qaeda and 
did not provide any training or weapons, then the Taliban 
probably lacked the requisite “overall control” to become liable 
under Tadic.36  In sum:  “Tadic and Nicaragua v. United States can be 
reconciled to reach the conclusion that the Taliban’s allowing a safe 
haven to al Qaeda does not justify the [United States] launching an 
invasion of Afghanistan, toppling its government, inserting a new 
one in its place, and removing from its soil captured Taliban 
militia.”37 
 
32 MCDONNELL, supra note 23, at 262. 
33 Prosecutor v. Du [Ko Tadi], Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, ¶ 137 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999), available at 
http://icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acjug/en/tad-aj990715e.pdf.  
34 Despite claims to the contrary, the proposition that the ICTY established an 
alternative standard from Nicaragua holds true.  For an explanation as to why 
Tadic established a different standard than that used by the ICJ in Nicaragua, see 
Christopher Greenwood, War, Terrorism, and International Law, in 56 CURRENT 
LEGAL PROBLEMS 505, 521 (Michael Freeman ed., 2004). 
35 See MCDONNELL, supra note 23, at 263–64 (noting that while the Taliban 
allowed al Qaeda to conduct activities in Afghanistan, the Taliban could argue 
against responsibility under Tadic by claiming “that it did not fund al Qaeda or 
provide it with training, weapons, or supplies.”).  
36 See id. at 264 (positing that since the Taliban did not provide supplies to al 
Qaeda or directly coordinate any of its activities, the Taliban may have arguably 
lacked effective or overall control over al Qaeda under Tadic).  
37 Id.  
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2.1.2. Self-Defense Under Historic International Law 
The U.S. invasion of Afghanistan rapidly became a war against 
the Taliban and not those responsible for September 11.  Thus, the 
continued war is likely illegal under the ICJ’s definition of self-
defense against a state harboring terrorists.  Despite this likelihood, 
the United States has consistently claimed self-defense against the 
Taliban as the primary reason for its continued invasion.38  Charles 
Allen, then Deputy General Counsel for International Affairs at the 
Department of Defense under President George W. Bush, 
explained that in a global war on terror, the United States can 
lawfully target “‘[a]l Qaeda and other international terrorists 
around the world and those who support such terrorists without 
warning.’”39  Allen suggested the United States has “the legal right 
to target and kill an [al Qaeda] suspect on the streets of Hamburg, 
Germany, or any other peaceful place.”40 
Much has been written about the dubious legality of the so-
called ‘Bush Doctrine’ in general.  But does the Bush Doctrine 
approach work, specifically, with Afghanistan as of 2010?  Is this 
type of ‘self-defense’ legal? 
As noted earlier, there are two main origins for self-defense 
under international law.  First, “[i]n 1837, US Secretary of State 
Daniel Webster articulated a definition of self-defence, which 
evolved into customary international law.”41  This definition arose 
from the Caroline case, in which British forces destroyed a U.S. 
vessel, the Caroline, while it attempted to deliver goods to 
Canadian insurgents.42  The British shot at the Caroline and set it 
on fire.  Webster declared that Britain’s actions did not constitute 
legal self-defense, which was only justified if the “necessity of 
 
38 See Obama, supra note 7 (claiming continued authorization for the United 
States to send troops to Afghanistan as a result of the September 11th attacks and 
the Taliban’s refusal to turn over Osama bin Laden).  
39 O’Connell, supra note 22, at 453.  See also Doyle McManus, A U.S. License to 
Kill, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2003, at A1, A5 (discussing the CIA’s “targeted killing” of 
suspected terrorists). 
40 See O’Connell, supra note 22, at 453 (explaining the Bush administration’s 
position that the September 11th attacks were an act of war by al Qaeda and so the 
United States was engaged in war wherever al Qaeda existed). 
41 Guiora, supra note 4, at 8.  
42 Id. (articulating the events surrounding the Caroline incident).  
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[that] self-defense [is] instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of 
means, and no moment for deliberation.”43 
After applying the aforementioned historical definition of self-
defense under international law to the United States’ continued 
involvement in Afghanistan, it is difficult to argue that the military 
invasion is legal.  This difficulty is particularly troubling because 
the United States has continually claimed self-defense since the 
onset of the invasion.44 
Initially, the United States might legitimately have claimed that 
there was an overwhelming necessity to invade Afghanistan in 
October 2001 because more attacks by al Qaeda were promised and 
many members of al Qaeda were suspected of hiding out in 
Afghanistan.45  It is now widely believed, however, including by 
President Karzai himself, that al Qaeda is no longer in 
Afghanistan.46  In light of this belief, the United States’ deployment 
of 30,000 more troops, announced in December 2009, more than 
eight years after the initial invasion, renders untenable the position 
that America’s current military presence falls under the auspices of 
the Caroline Doctrine of self-defense.  This untenable position is 
further exacerbated by the lack of any attack on the United States 
 
43 Emanuel Gross, Thwarting Terrorist Acts by Attacking the Perpetrators or Their 
Commanders as an Act of Self-Defense: Human Rights versus the State’s Duty to Protect 
its Citizens, 15 TEMP. INT’L. & COMP. L.J. 195, 211 (2001) (noting that use of force in 
self-defense under this doctrine applies only to the rare case where the need for 
self-defense is immediate and there is no way to employ less harmful measures).  
44 See President George W. Bush, Address to Joint Session of Congress and 
the American People, ¶ 19–20 (Sept. 20, 2001), 
http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html [hereinafter 
Bush Speech (Sept. 20, 2001)] (announcing the Bush Administration’s intention to 
“take defensive measures against terrorism to protect Americans and demanding 
that the Taliban turn over terrorists” or else “share in their fate”); President 
George W. Bush, Presidential Address to the Nation (Oct. 7, 2001), 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/10 
/20011007-8.html [hereinafter Bush Speech (Oct. 7, 2001)] (reporting the 
commencement of military strikes on al Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan); 
Obama, supra note 7 (reaffirming the war’s original goal “to defend our 
homeland” in announcing deployment of additional troops to Afghanistan 
because the Taliban had purportedly gained momentum and continued  to act as 
a safe haven for al Qaeda in Afghanistan). 
45 See Osama bin Laden, Statement, GUARDIAN (London), Oct. 7, 2001, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2001/oct/07/afghanistan.terrorism15 
(threatening continued action against the United States and its allies). 
46 See Ferran, supra note 20 (noting the Afghani president’s belief that al 
Qaeda was driven out of Afghanistan in 2001). 
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by al Qaeda since 9/11, much less by the Taliban or any terrorist 
from Afghanistan. 
Since the mid-nineteenth century, the Caroline Doctrine has 
been one basis for which states can rely upon self-defense as a use 
of force under international law.  By the mid-twentieth century, 
however, World War II and Hitler’s advancement throughout 
Europe brought new changes to the international legal landscape.  
The United Nations was born in 1945 and with it came another, 
narrower, concept of self-defense under Article 51 of the U.N. 
Charter.47 
2.1.3.  Self-Defense Under Article 51 
Though self-defense is a broad and sometimes nebulous 
concept, Article 51 of the 1945 U.N. Charter did its best to codify 
the main tenets of a legal self-defense action.  “In an effort to avoid 
repeating the horrors of the Second World War, the UN Charter 
calls on nation states to peacefully resolve their conflicts.”48  A 
central purpose of the United Nations is “to save succeeding 
generations from the scourge of war;”49 therefore, “[a]ll members 
shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means.”50  
However, despite a mandate to try and resolve all disputes by 
peaceful means, the drafters of the U.N. Charter understood that 
states have an inherent right to self-defense.  The key would be 
outlining the parameters of when and to what extent self-defense is 
legally justified. 
Article 51 states: 
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent 
right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed 
attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until 
the Security Council has taken measures necessary to 
maintain international peace and security.  Measures taken 
by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall 
 
47 See U.N. Charter art. 51 (reserving the right of member states to engage in 
individual or collective self-defense in response to an armed attack).  
48 Guiora, supra note 4, at 9 (stating that Article 51 sought to limit the 
circumstances in which countries could implement self-defense against other 
member states to encourage settlement of international disputes through peaceful 
means).  
49 U.N. Charter Preamble, para. 1.  
50 U.N. Charter Art. 2, para. 3.  
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be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall 
not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the 
Security Council under the present Charter to take at any 
time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain 
or restore international peace and security.51 
There are several key provisions worth noting within Article 
51.  First, it is only supposed to be triggered “if an armed attack 
occurs.”52  This is a significant departure from and limitation of the 
Caroline Doctrine, which allows for the preemptive use of force if 
an attack is imminent.  Scholars such as Eugene Rostow have 
argued that strict adherence to the “armed attack” requirement of 
Article 51 would turn the U.N. into a “suicide pact.”53  States 
would conceivably have to wait until fired upon to retaliate, even 
as they saw the armies running up to the border or bombers flying 
overhead. 
Here, however, it is not necessary to engage fully in the “armed 
attack” debate because an armed attack on the U.S. preceded 
America’s military invasion of Afghanistan and subsequent claims 
of self-defense.  Nevertheless, Jules Lobel’s description of Article 51 
is instructive: 
The United Nations Charter prohibits the use of force 
except when authorized by the Security Council or when 
undertaken by individual nations in self-defense and in 
response to “an armed attack.”  Moreover, as a general 
matter, the United Nations has sought to limit the Article 51 
self-defense exception to prevent its misuse.  First, Article 
51 permits only those actions taken in self-defense; reprisals 
and retaliations are proscribed under the U.N. Charter.  In 
other words, a nation can respond to an ongoing attack, 
including one waged by a terrorist organization, by using 
force.  However, that nation may not forcibly retaliate 
against another in response to an unlawful act that the 
latter committed against the former in the past.  The 
reasoning behind this rule is simple: a nation subject to an 
ongoing attack cannot be expected to wait for the 
international community’s aid before fighting back.  
Obviously, when a nation is under attack, immediate action 
 
51 U.N. Charter art. 51. 
52 Id. 
53 Eugene Rostow, Law is Not a Suicide Pact, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1983, at A35. 
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is necessary.  On the other hand, a nation whose citizens are 
no longer being attacked must seek U.N. intervention; to 
allow military reprisals would be to encourage the renewed 
use of force.  This would result in a spiraling escalation of 
violence.  Thus, the U.S. government, most state actors, the 
U.N. Security Council, and the International Court of 
Justice have officially taken the position that armed 
reprisals are outlawed.54 
Thus, it appears that continued military involvement in 
another state can only be allowed if the invading state remains 
under attack, or, under the Caroline doctrine, under such 
imminent threat of attack that there is no time for deliberation.  
Such is not the case for the United States in Afghanistan.55  Without 
legitimate approval and authority from Karzai, America’s 
continued involvement in Afghanistan amounts to nothing more 
than a giant—and illegal—military reprisal. 
It can certainly be argued, however, that the United States 
remains under a general threat of attack from al Qaeda.  On 
December 25, 2009, a Nigerian man, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, 
tried to blow up a plane from Amsterdam heading from Detroit.56  
The man waited almost the entire flight to be sure he was over 
American soil before attempting to ignite a bomb.57  He also 
claimed ties to al Qaeda and, several months prior to this incident, 
his own father reported him for having radical jihadist 
tendencies.58 
But an ongoing threat from al Qaeda does not legally justify the 
ongoing killing of civilians in Afghanistan.  By most accounts 
 
54 Jules Lobel, The Use of Force to Respond to Terrorist Attacks: The Bombing of 
Sudan and Afghanistan, 24 YALE J. INTL. L. 537, 540 (1999) (internal citation omitted). 
55 But see Saad Gul & Katharine M. Royal, Burning the Barn to Roast the Pig?  
Proportionality Concerns in the War on Terror and the Damadola Incident, 14 
WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DIS. RES. 49, 67–68 (2006) (“The list of terrorist attacks 
attributed to al-Qaeda is long and geographically-diverse: Yemen in 1992, Kenya 
and Tanzania in 1998, U.S.S. Cole berthed in Yemen in 2000, New York City in 
2001, Bali in 2002, Madrid in 2004, and London in 2005.”)  Notice, however, there 
have, at the time of this Article, been no terrorist attacks on U.S. soil since 2001.   
56 See Kevin Krolicki & Jeremy Pelofsky, Nigerian Charged with Trying to Blow 
up U.S. Jet, REUTERS, Dec. 26, 2009, available at http://www.reuters.com 
/article/idUSLDE5BP03M20091226 (discussing the details of Abdulmutallab’s 
attempted attack and outlining the U.S. reaction to the attempt). 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
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America is not fighting al Qaeda in Afghanistan anymore—it is 
fighting the Taliban.59  Umar Abdulmutallab did not come from 
Afghanistan.  He is not a member of the Taliban.  He is a wealthy 
Nigerian twenty-three-year-old who was recruited by al Qaeda in 
London and met with a radical American Muslim cleric in 
Yemen.60  This situation illustrates the difficulty in pursuing a 
global war on terror and highlights the need for clearer guidelines 
for when a leader can authorize a military invasion. 
At present, more than a decade after the invasion, it is highly 
questionable whether the threat of future attacks against the 
United States by al Qaeda—originating in Afghanistan—is 
credible.  Since Osama bin Laden’s death in April 2011, many have 
warned of a possible backlash by al Qaeda, a sort of payback for 
killing bin Laden.61  But it is highly unlikely that any such attacks 
by al Qaeda would originate in Afghanistan, as they have long 
since left the region.62  Unfortunately for America, its continued 
military involvement in Afghanistan withers under the scrutiny of 
the self-defense concepts of necessity and proportionality. 
2.1.3.1.  Necessity and Proportionality in 2011 
“In support of the legality of Operation Enduring Freedom, the 
U.S. invoked Article 51 of the U.N. Charter and proclaimed the 
 
59 See Ferran, supra note 20 (noting President Karzai’s comment that al Qaeda 
has “’no base in Afghanistan’”); Obama, supra note 7 (addressing the Taliban’s 
power and the “military strategy that will break the Taliban’s momentum [in 
Afghanistan]”). 
60 See Rich Schapiro, Flight 253 Terrorist Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab Led Life of 
Luxury in London Before Attempted Attack, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Dec. 27, 2009, 
http://articles.nydailynews.com/2009-12-27/news/17942464_1_umar-farouk-
abdulmutallab-british-international-school-trafalgar-square (describing 
Abdulmutallah’s background, his family wealth, his education in top schools, and 
his luxurious apartment in London’s “poshest neighborhoods”). 
61 See DAILY MAIL REPORTER, First the Tears, Now the Anger: Pakistanis Burn 
U.S. Flags as Backlash Over bin Laden’s Death Grows, MAIL ONLINE (London), May 4, 
2011, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1383011/Osama-Bin-Laden-
dead-Pakistanis-burn-US-flags-backlash-grows.html (discussing protests and 
public burnings of U.S. flags in reaction to bin Laden’s death); Will Brodie, Expert 
Warns of Backlash After bin Laden Death, THE AGE (Melbourne), May 2, 2011, 
http://www.theage.com.au/world/expert-warns-of-backlash-after-bin-laden-
death-20110502-1e495.html (noting one professor’s prediction that “al-Qaeda will 
remain strong without its infamous leader”). 
62 See Ferran, supra note 20 (stating that “[a]l Qaeda was driven out of 
Afghanistan in 2001.”).  According to many, Yemen is the new hotbed of al Qaeda.  
See Robert F. Worth, On the Ground in Yemen, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 24, 2011, at 25, 
31 (discussing al Qaeda’s presence and methods of communication in Yemen). 
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right to individual and collective self-defense through military 
action.”63  By relying on Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, the United 
States indicated that OEF should be evaluated against the 
standards for self-defense actions under international law.64 
In addition to the requirements already discussed, international 
law imposes two more basic requirements on states that engage in 
self-defensive armed responses:  necessity and proportionality.65  
“Although neither requirement is conclusively defined in 
international law, each obligation aims to regulate the force needed 
to subdue the enemy accomplished with minimal collateral 
damage.”66 
If America’s continued military involvement in Afghanistan is 
necessary and proportional to the threat, then whether Karzai 
provides legitimate approval for the continued invasion is legally 
irrelevant.  The United States would not need to rely on the 
consent doctrine exception or a U.N. Security Council resolution 
because it would already be acting in accordance with 
international law.67  If any nation suffers an attack and 
subsequently responds militarily in self-defense within the 
confines of Article 51, then its behavior is legal under international 
law.  Self-defense’s inapplicability becomes an issue if the 
militarily intervention is no longer necessary or proportional to the 
threat posed by the invaded state. 
To determine whether military intervention is necessary and 
proportional, one must look at the stated goals of the intervention.  
Former President George W. Bush articulated the military 
 
63 Gul & Royal, supra note 55, at 54. For a history and analysis of the right to 
self-defense under international law, see Saad Gul, The Bells of Hell: An Assessment 
of the Sinking of ANR General Belgrano in the Context of the Falkands Conflict, 18 N.Y. 
INT’L L. REV 81, 89 (2005) (“Article 51 does not create the right of self-defense . . . it 
reflects a customary norm that was already well established prior to World War II 
by, among others, the 1919 Covenant of the League of Nations, the Locarno Treaty 
and the 1928 Treaty of Paris.”). 
64 Jack M. Beard, America’s New War on Terror: the Case for Self-Defense Under 
International Law, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 559, 566–67 (2002) (explaining 
differences in scope between Article 51 self-defense and inherent right of self-
defense under customary international law). 
65 See George K. Walker, The Lawfulness of Operation Enduring Freedom’s Self-
Defense Responses, 37 VAL. U. L. REV. 489, 521 (2003) (detailing the “basic 
requirements of . . . necessity and proportionality”). 
66 Gul & Royal, supra note 55, at 55. 
67 Nor would the United States need to rely on the Caroline Doctrine and 
other customary international law. 
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objectives of the United States in Afghanistan in his September 20, 
2001, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and his October 7, 
2001, address to the country.  America’s three main goals were “[1] 
the destruction of terrorist training camps and infrastructure 
within Afghanistan; [2] the capture of Al Qaeda and Taliban 
leaders; and [3] the cessation of terrorist activities in 
Afghanistan.”68 
These goals appeared to be reasonable and as such there was 
and still is a general international consensus that, initially, the 
United States invasion of Afghanistan was both necessary and 
proportional.69 
But by December 2001 the Taliban government was 
extinguished and al Qaeda largely removed from the region.70  As 
former CIA analyst Kenneth Pollack of the Brookings Institution 
notes “[y]ou have to understand that the CIA considers 
Afghanistan its most successful arena. This is where the CIA 
believes it has won two wars, in 1989 and 2001.”71  The victorious 
war the CIA refers to was America’s self-defense war against al 
Qaeda in response to the 9/11 attacks.  But that is not who the 
United States is fighting in Afghanistan in 2011.  Without the 
original enemy, America’s continued war making in Afghanistan 
against the Taliban has become unnecessary under international 
law: 
When Kuwait was liberated, the coalition forces did not go 
all the way to Baghdad and did not eliminate the regime of 
 
68 K. ALAN KRONSTADT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21658, INTERNATIONAL 
TERRORISM IN SOUTH ASIA 2 (2003), available at 
http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RS21658.pdf.  See also Bush Speech (Sept. 20, 2001), 
supra note 44 (announcing the start of the ‘War on Terror’ and demanding the 
closure of terrorist training camps and the handover of terrorists); Bush Speech 
(Oct. 7, 2001), supra note 44 (announcing military strikes in Afghanistan in 
response to non-compliance with American demands).  
69 See Gul & Royal, supra note 55, at 55 (explaining that Operation Enduring 
Freedom met the necessary and proportional requirements); O’Connell, supra note 
21, at 908 (“[Operation Enduring Freedom] was a lawful decision since the United 
States had initially been the victim of a significant armed attack and it had clear 
and convincing evidence of both planned future attacks and Afghanistan’s 
responsibility for both past and planned attacks.”). 
70 Ferran, supra note 20.  See also O’Connell, supra note 21, at 908 
(contemplating the legality of America’s operations in Afghanistan “after the fall 
of the Taliban government”). 
71 Joe Klein, The CIA Double Cross: How Bad a Blow in Afghanistan?, TIME, Jan. 
7, 2010, http://www.time.com/time/politics/article/0,8599,1952149,00.html. 
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Saddam Hussein. . . . Operation Enduring Freedom 
properly aimed at eliminating the military capacity of the 
Taliban and al Qaeda.  Leaders of either group could be 
apprehended and brought to justice in the United States or 
elsewhere.  Eliminating the whole government structure 
created by the Taliban, as a war aim was beyond necessary 
self-defense.  Attacking other states is wholly 
unjustifiable.72 
The analogy to Kuwait is interesting and will be explored in more 
detail below.  But the most striking thing about this assessment is 
when it occurred—the summer of 2002.  Since then, the United 
States has continued to bomb and kill thousands of Afghan 
civilians.73  Is it still necessary to kill Afghan civilians in a fight 
against the Taliban when al Qaeda is the group that attacked 
America more than a decade ago? 
There is also strong debate regarding the proportionality of the 
continuous attacks in Afghanistan.74  International law “defines 
proportionality not in terms of the original aggression,75 but in 
terms of what is required to neutralize and deter future aggression:  
‘Proportionality contemplates responses parallel in intensity to an 
initial aggression and designed to discourage future attacks.’“76 
Another definition of proportionality focuses on the endgame.  
Does the action taken in response to an attack, or threat of attack, 
reduce the threat?  Does it eliminate an ongoing attack?  “[I]n the 
case of action taken for the specific purpose of halting and 
repelling an armed attack, this does not mean that the action 
 
72 O’Connell, supra note 21, at 904. 
73 See Marc W. Herold, A Dossier on Civilian Victims of United States’ Aerial 
Bombing of Afghanistan, Appendix 4: Daily Casualty Count of Afghan Civilians 
Killed by U.S. Bombing and Special Forces Attacks, October 7 Until Present Day 
(October 16, 2003) (unpublished manuscript), http://pubpages.unh.edu 
/~mwherold/AfghanDailyCount.pdf. 
74 See O’Connell, supra note 21, at 904 (noting “that [the] amount and type of 
force” the United States used “may have exceeded both necessity and 
proportionality”). 
75 Enzo Cannizzaro, The Role of Proportionality in the Law of International 
Countermeasures, 12 EUR. J. INT’L L. 889, 893 (2001). 
76  Gul & Royal, supra note 55, at 59–60.  However, early international law did 
impose such a requirement.  See Cannizzaro, supra note 75, at 891 (noting that 
“the requirement that the injurious consequences of the response be roughly 
equivalent with those of the wrongful act”).  See generally Gul & Royal supra, at 53 
(detailing events on 9/11 and weeks afterward); BOB WOODWARD, BUSH AT WAR 
(Simon & Schuster 2002) (chronicling the aftermath of 9/11). 
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should be more or less commensurate with the attack.  Its 
lawfulness cannot be measured except by its capacity for achieving 
the desired result.”77  The desired results from the initial 
Afghanistan invasion were clear—remove and weaken al Qaeda 
until little or no terrorist activities remain in Afghanistan.78  This 
goal was arguably accomplished by December 2001.79  This is 
further buttressed by Secretary of State Colin Powell’s comments, 
ten days into the initial invasion, in which he indicated America’s 
goal was not to entirely eliminate the Taliban.80 
Yet despite this seemingly accomplished goal, America remains 
militarily engaged in Afghanistan more than a decade later.  
Further, in 2010 America significantly ramped up its war efforts by 
doubling the number of troops in Afghanistan to specifically 
eliminate the Taliban entirely.81  Even with Obama’s proposed 
 
77 Roberto Ago, Addendum to Eighth Report on State Responsibility, [1980] (2)(1) 
Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 13, 69, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/318/ADD.5–7. 
78 See, e.g., Bush Speech (Sept. 20, 2001) supra note 44 (“[T]he United States of 
America makes the following demands on the Taliban: . . . Close immediately and 
permanently every terrorist training camp in Afghanistan, and hand over every 
terrorist, and every person in their support structure, to appropriate authorities.”); 
Bush Speech (Oct. 7, 2001), supra note 44 (“[T]he United States military has begun 
strikes against al Qaeda terrorist training camps and military installations of the 
Taliban regime in Afghanistan . . . to disrupt the use of Afghanistan as a terrorist 
base of operations, and to attack the military capability of the Taliban regime.”). 
79 See generally O’Connell, supra note 21, at 904 (indicating that the United 
States caused the fall of the Taliban by December 2001 and citing criticism of 
certain acts of continued U.S. force after that date); Ferran, supra note 20, paras. 1–
4 (announcing statements by President Hamid Karzai that the war against al 
Qaeda should not be in Afghanistan because they were driven out in 2001); Klein, 
supra note 71, at 31 (describing how the fatal 2010 attack on the CIA in 
Afghanistan challenges many assumptions because the CIA believes it won the 
war there in 2001). 
80 See O’Connell, supra note 21, at 904 (explaining that although Operation 
Enduring Freedom completely routed the Taliban from power, Powell’s statement 
indicates that the United States didn’t initially intend to use disproportionate 
force, i.e., eliminate the Taliban entirely). 
81 See Obama, supra note 7 (announcing President Obama’s plan to send 
30,000 more troops to Afghanistan for eighteen months with the overarching aim 
of disrupting, dismantling, and defeating al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan); 
Eric Schmitt & Tom Shanker, General Calls for More U.S. Troops to Avoid Afghan 
Failure, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09 
/21/world/asia/21afghan.html (describing General McChrystal’s August 2009 
report that additional troops were needed in Afghanistan in order to avoid to 
avoid mission failure); Sciutto et al., supra note 6 (reporting on the winding down 
of the 2010 surge which had purportedly helped advance U.S. objectives aimed at 
“disrupting and dismantling al Qaeda and inflicting ‘serious losses’ on the 
Taliban”). 
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troop reductions in 2011–2012, America is still slated to have 
roughly 70,000 troops actively fighting in Afghanistan well into 
2014.82  Proponents of the war offer numerous policy reasons to 
support America’s continued heavy involvement,83 but is this 
behavior really proportional to the threat of al Qaeda coming out 
of Afghanistan?  The facts simply do not support such an assertion.  
Thus, “[t]he most serious question regarding the legality of 
[Operation] Enduring Freedom concerns whether the operation 
remained necessary and proportional to America’s self-defense 
after the fall of the Taliban government.”84 
The goals remain primarily the same—and they remain 
accomplished.85  Is it really necessary to militarily defeat the 
Taliban to keep America safe from the terrorists that were 
responsible for the September 11 attacks more than a decade ago?  
Notably, there are no claims in the international community that 
the Taliban are the “terrorists” directly responsible for 9/11.  
 
82 Sciutto et al., supra note 6 (noting that according to current plans, President 
Obama will withdraw 33,000 troops total by the summer of 2012). 
83 See Schmitt & Shanker, supra note 81 (describing General McChrystal’s 
statements in August 2009 that a failure to “‘gain the initiative and reverse 
insurgent momentum in the near term’” creates the risk that defeating the 
insurgency will become impossible).  The argument that al Qaeda will simply 
return to Afghanistan if America leaves is beyond the scope of this Article.  
Nevertheless, perhaps such an inquiry fails to ask the right question.  Al Qaeda is 
not a local Afghanistan or Pakistan operation.  Whether they return to 
Afghanistan misses the point, for several reasons.  First, followers and members of 
al Qaeda no longer need to go to Afghanistan to be trained or to study and learn 
jihadist ways to destroy the West.  Followers of al Qaeda reside all over the globe, 
from Fort Hood, Texas, to Colorado, to Yemen.  See, e.g., Deb Feyerich and Jeanne 
Meserve, Suspect in Terror Probe Admits Ties to al Qaeda, Official Says, CNN, (Sept. 
18, 2009, 9:44 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/09/18/terror.raid 
/index.html (describing the arrest of a 24-year old resident of Colorado and 
national of Afghanistan for his involvement in an alleged terrorist plot in the 
United States); Hundreds of militants Planning Attacks from Yemen, Foreign Minister 
Says, FOXNEWS.COM (Dec. 29, 2009), http://www.foxnews.com/story 
/0,2933,581370,00.html (reporting that according to the Foreign Minister of 
Yemen, hundreds of al Qaeda are planning terror attacks from Yemen).  Second, 
because al Qaeda is united by an ideology, it has no specific territory (like 
Afghanistan) that can be taken to defeat it.  Traditional warfare methods, such as 
those currently being utilized by the United States through Predator drone 
bombing and hand-to-hand combat, may not be effective.  See generally Cronin, 
supra note 9, at 1 (“[I]nternational terrorism is an enduring challenge that will not 
be ‘defeated’ as in a ‘war.’”). 
84 O’Connell, supra note 21, at 908. 
85 See generally Klein, supra note 71 at 31 (“’You have to understand that the 
CIA considers Afghanistan its most successful arena.  This is where the CIA 
believes it has won two wars, in 1989 and 2001’”). 
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Members of the Taliban have not declared a jihad against the 
United States or the West.  To the contrary, the Taliban claims it 
simply wants the United States to leave: 
We had and have no plan of harming countries of the 
world, including those in Europe . . . our goal is the 
independence of the country and the building of an Islamic 
state . . . .  Still, if you (NATO and U.S. troops) want to 
colonise the country of proud and pious Afghans under the 
baseless pretext of a war on terror, then you should know 
that our patience will only increase and that we are ready 
for a long war.86 
Regardless of that statement’s veracity, the Taliban is still primarily 
comprised of drug lords that are defending themselves against the 
onslaught of American troops.87  Thus, despite claims to the 
contrary, America’s military involvement is no longer a self-
defense action against al Qaeda that comports with the concepts of 
necessity and proportionality under Article 51.88  America 
continues to embark on a new war against the Taliban.  America’s 
continued reliance on Article 51’s self-defense provision to justify 
this war is misplaced and unjustifiable. 
3. U.N. AUTHORIZATION 
If a State cannot legitimately use force (1) under the Caroline 
doctrine; (2) in self-defense under Nicaragua’s “effective control” 
test or the Tadic test; or (3) as a necessary and proportional 
response under Article 51, there is still another way to legally use 
force—by obtaining U.N. Security Council approval.  Thus, despite 
America’s apparent lack of legal authority for the use of force in 
 
86 Sayed Salahuddin & Peter Graff, Taliban Say Control Area After Battle with 
U.S., REUTERS, Oct. 7, 2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article 
/idUSSP402619. 
87 This is not to argue that the Taliban are kind and fair individuals worthy of 
ruling Afghanistan.  But however undesirable and violent they may be, they are 
not radical jihadists like members of al Qaeda.  See generally GRETCHEN PETERS, 
SEEDS OF TERROR (2009) (describing the pervasive narcotics trade by the Taliban in 
Afghanistan and the extensive resulting profits to the insurgency in Afghanistan, 
and arguing that nexus between drug traffickers and terrorist groups is the new 
axis of evil). 
88 See generally O’Connell, supra note 21, at 902–04 (describing four conditions 
for a country to take military action against another state in self-defense in 
absence of a U.N. Security Council authorization, including that force be 
necessary and proportional to the injury threatened). 
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Afghanistan under all the aforementioned possible legal 
justifications, a U.N. Security Council Resolution authorizing the 
use of force would legitimize its continued military invasion. 
Long before the United States invaded Afghanistan, the U.N. 
passed a Resolution which helped clarify the rules for international 
use of force.  That Resolution, entitled the Declaration on Principles 
of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations (U.N. Declaration), was passed in 1970 on the 25th 
anniversary of the U.N.89  The U.N. Declaration was particularly 
concerned with state sovereignty in the new emerging 
interconnected global world.  To that end, the U.N. Declaration 
codified seven principles, five of which are directly relevant to 
America’s continued military involvement in Afghanistan: 
(a) The principle that States shall refrain in their 
international relations from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of 
any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
purposes of the United Nations, . . . 
(c) The duty not to intervene in matters within the domestic 
jurisdiction of any State, in accordance with the Charter, . . . 
(e) The principle of equal rights and self-determination of 
peoples, . . . 
(f) The principle of sovereign equality of States, . . . 
(g) The principle that States shall fulfill in good faith the 
obligations assumed by them in accordance with the 
Charter . . . .90 
Principle (a) is essentially a recitation of Article 2(4) of the U.N. 
Charter.  As already noted, America’s use of force in Afghanistan 
easily violates this principle, as the use of force is designed to 
threaten the political independence and territorial integrity of the 
state.  By unilaterally using force to overthrow the current 
government of Afghanistan, a country that never attacked it, the 
United States violated the first Principle of the Declaration. 
America also arguably violated Principle (c).  The 
establishment of the Interim Authority is not inherently against 
 
89 G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 13. 
90 Id. 
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international law in it of itself.  But when coupled with the rest of 
America’s actions, the installation of the Interim Authority 
constitutes intervention within the domestic jurisdiction of another 
state, in this case to America’s benefit.  America helped install an 
ersatz government with a puppet leader, and continued to conduct 
war in that country at the behest of that appointed leader, who 
remained in power through rigged elections and security provided 
by America.  The rigged elections of 2004 and 2009 also violate 
Principle (e), as the self-determination and equal rights of the 
Afghan people are not being observed when in 2004 the American 
backed Karzai government made sure that Karzai received “over 
75% of all state and radio coverage” and “85% of all the editorial 
coverage of candidates” nor when election fraud has taken place.91  
This is not the behavior of a state that values the sovereign equality 
of all states.  (Principle (f)). 
Finally, Principle (g) requests that member states fulfill in good 
faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the 
Charter.  The U.N. Charter obliges all member states “to peacefully 
resolve their conflicts.”92  Its preamble states the purpose of the 
United Nations is “to save the succeeding generations from the 
scourge of war.”93  “All Members shall settle their international 
disputes by peaceful means . . . .”94  The unilateral actions of the 
United States in Afghanistan do not comport with its obligations 
under the U.N. Charter, unless, of course, there is specific U.N. 
Security Council Resolution authorizing and approving of the 
continued use and extent of force in Afghanistan against the 
Taliban. 
3.1. Resolutions 1368 and 1373 
Following the 9/11 attacks on America, the U.N. Security 
Council swiftly passed two resolutions addressing appropriate 
responses to terrorism.  The first, passed September 12, 2001, is 
Resolution 1368, the key provisions of which are as follows: 
The Security Council, Reaffirming the principles and purposes 
of the Charter of the United Nations, Determined to combat 
 
91 Andrew North, ‘Heavy Poll Bias’ Towards Karzai, BBC NEWS (Oct. 4, 2004, 
5:32 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3712460.stm. 
92 Guiora, supra note 4, at 9. 
93 U.N. Charter Preamble, para. 1.  
94 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 3.  
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by all means threats to international peace and security 
caused by terrorist acts, Recognizing the inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defence in accordance with the 
Charter, . . . 
3. Calls on all States to work together urgently to bring to 
justice the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these 
terrorist attacks and stresses that those responsible for 
aiding, supporting or harbouring the perpetrators, 
organizers and sponsors of these acts will be held 
accountable; 
4. Calls also on the international community to redouble 
their efforts to prevent and suppress terrorist acts including 
by increased cooperation and full implementation of the 
relevant international anti-terrorist conventions and 
Security Council resolutions, in particular resolution 1269 
(1999) of 19 October 1999; 
5. Expresses its readiness to take all necessary steps to 
respond to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, and to 
combat all forms of terrorism, in accordance with its 
responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations . . . 
.95  
And two weeks later, the Security Council passed 1373: 
The Security Council, Reaffirming its resolutions 1269 (1999) 
of 19 October 1999 and 1368 (2001) of 12 September 2001, . . 
. Reaffirming further that such acts, like any act of 
international terrorism, constitute a threat to international 
peace and security, Reaffirming the inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defence as recognized by the 
Charter of the United Nations as reiterated in resolution 
1368 (2001), . . . 2. Decides also that all States shall: . . . (b) 
Take the necessary steps to prevent the commission of 
terrorist acts, including by provision of early warning to 
other States by exchange of information; . . . 3. Calls upon all 
States to: . . . (c) Cooperate, particularly through bilateral 
and multilateral arrangements and agreements, to prevent 
 
95 S. C. Res. 1368, pmbl. arts. 3–5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001). 
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and suppress terrorist attacks and take action against 
perpetrators of such acts . . . .96 
Notably, neither of these resolutions specifically authorizes the 
use of military force in Afghanistan.  Some scholars argue, 
however, that these resolutions articulate a new set of rules 
regarding self-defense and the use of force in international 
relations.97  There are others, such as Thomas Franck, who argue 
that these resolutions do in fact authorize the United States to use 
force against the Taliban, and they do so without creating a new set 
of self-defense laws.98  “Resolution 1368 makes even clearer, in the 
context of condemning the September 11 attack on the United 
States, the responsibility for terrorism of ‘sponsors of these terrorist 
attacks’ including those ‘supporting or harbouring the 
perpetrators.’ (para. 3).  The Taliban clearly fit that designation.”99 
Franck wrote this in 2001, when arguably those responsible for 
“supporting or harboring the perpetrators”, al Qaeda, were still in 
Afghanistan.  But that was more than a decade ago, and al Qaeda 
has largely left the region.100  For example, bin Laden and members 
 
96 S. C. Res. 1373, pmbl., arts. 2–3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001). 
97 See, e.g., Jose E. Alvarez, Editorial Comment , Hegemonic International Law 
Revisited, 97 AM. J. INT’L. L. 873, 879 (2003) (surveying the recent practice of the 
U.N. Security Council and the refusal to explicitly endorse Operation Iraqi 
Freedom, as evidence of the Council’s new ‘legislative phase’ in which it has 
created legally binding regulations rather than authorize specific responses to 
specific instances involving specific states).  The veracity of this argument is in 
doubt, however, as evidenced by Alvarez’s parade of qualifiers before articulating 
it:  
Given the legislative efforts in at least one of those resolutions (1373) and 
the tendency for many of the Council’s actions to be read as having 
broader normative effect, the prospective endorsement of individual and 
collective self-defense by the Council, together with its later acquiescence 
in Operation Enduring Freedom, may signal, depending on how the 
Council’s license comes to be interpreted by its licensee, the advent of 
three new general rules with respect to defensive force in the age of 
terrorism. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
98 Thomas M. Franck, Editorial Comments, Terrorism and the Right of Self-
Defense, 95 AM. J. INT’L. L. 839, 842–43 (2001) (arguing that Resolutions 1368 and 
1373 expand the definition of an attack and an attacker, but preserve a state’s 
discretion to define an attack as part of the inherent right of self-defense 
preserved in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter).   
99 Id. at 841. 
100 See generally O’Connell, supra note 21, at 908 (“It appears that 
proportionality is the concept around which the law of armed conflict and 
international criminal law enforcement are coming to coalesce.  September 11 and 
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of his family were found and killed in their home of more than five 
years in Pakistan.101  It is highly doubtful that those responsible for 
the September 11 attacks, and in particular the specific members of 
the Taliban that harbored them, are still in Afghanistan.  It is even 
more doubtful that the Security Council, in passing Resolution 
1368, meant to give the United States authorization to war against 
the Taliban until 2025.102  Thus, though Franck may be correct in 
that, as of 2001, Security Council Resolution 1368 did arguably 
authorize America to use force against the Taliban in Afghanistan 
because in 2001 they were harboring the perpetrators of September 
11, that same resolution can no longer be relied upon in 2011 for 
America’s continued war against the remaining members of the 
Taliban, as the perpetrators of September 11 are likely long gone.103  
In short, the Taliban has nothing left to harbor. 
Others disagree further and maintain these resolutions do not 
introduce a broader meaning of self-defense, even if directed only 
at terrorism.104  According to Greg Maggs, Resolution 1368 “did 
not say what the right to self-defense entails.  Most particularly, it 
did not say that al Qaeda had committed an ‘armed attack’ for the 
purposes or [sic] Article 5 and it did not say that the United States 
had a right to act in self-defense in response to the attack by al 
Qaeda.”105 
 
its aftermath show that the once-clear divisions between crime and war are 
breaking down.”); Ferran, supra note 20 (noting President Karzai’s statement that 
“’Al Qaeda was driven out of Afghanistan in 2001’”). 
101 Wilson et al., supra note 5 (describing the raid which killed Osama bin 
Laden in Pakistan). 
102 See Joshua Keating, Karzai Sees Foreign Troops in Afghanistan for up to 15 
Tears, Morning Brief, FOREIGN POL’Y, Jan. 28, 2010, 
http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/node/88604 (reporting President Karzai’s 2010 
statements at a multi-national conference that an international presence could be 
in Afghanistan for up to fifteen years to develop sustainable Afghan security 
forces). 
103 See generally O’Connell, supra note 21, at 908 (noting that after the fall of 
the Taliban government self-defense may no longer a valid basis for the United 
States’ continued warfare in Afghanistan); Ferran, supra note 20 (“Afghan 
President Hamid Karzai said that the fight against al Qaeda was not in his 
country, but he welcomes additional U.S. troops to help protect the population”). 
104 See Alvarez, supra note 97, at 879 (arguing that the legislative efforts in the 
resolutions, along with additional factors, may signal the advent of new general 
rules with respect to defensive force in the age of terrorism). 
105 Gregory E. Maggs, The Campaign to Restrict the Right to Respond to Terrorist 
Attacks in Self-Defense Under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter and What the United States 
Can Do About It, 4 REGENT J. INT’L L. 149, 166 (2006).  
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What can generally be agreed upon is that while the resolutions 
may not be clear in what they authorize, they are clear in what they 
do not authorize.106  The concluding language of Resolution 1368 
comes closest to authorizing the use of force, when the U.N. 
Security Council stated its “readiness to take all necessary steps to 
respond to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, and to combat 
all forms of terrorism . . . .”107  Compare that language, however, to 
that of Security Council Resolution 678, regarding Iraq’s 1990 
invasion of Kuwait.  Resolution 678 specifically “[a]uthorizes 
Member States co-operating with the Government of Kuwait . . . to 
use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 
(1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore 
international peace and security in the area.”108 
In 1990, the Security Council specifically authorized member 
states to use whatever force necessary to expel Saddam Hussein 
from Kuwait.  None of the current resolutions regarding the 
attacks of September 11 similarly authorize any state to use 
whatever means necessary to expel and destroy al Qaeda 
anywhere in the world.  Moreover, enacting such a resolution 
would not likely solve the crux of the problem.  The situation in 
Afghanistan is, at a minimum, a standard deviation away from 
Kuwait in 1990, as America’s war in Afghanistan is no longer 
directed against al Qaeda, whereas America’s intervention in 
Kuwait was directed against Saddam Hussein.109  Thus, though 
there may be confusion regarding what Resolutions 1368 and 1373 
affirmatively authorize, it seems clear that they do not authorize 
the indefinite use of military force against the Taliban in 
Afghanistan.  “Instead, the coexisting International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF), established by Resolution 1386, has an 
explicit, though very limited, mandate to assist the new Afghan 
 
106 See Guiora, supra note 4, at 14–15 (stating that the resolutions may have 
neither said that al Qaeda had committed a qualifying armed attack nor that the 
US had a right to respond in self-defense).  “Security Council Resolutions 1368 
and 1373—do not provide a sufficiently clear guideline regarding when a state 
may act.”  Id. at 15. 
107 S.C. Res. 1368, supra note 95, ¶ 5 (emphasis added). 
108 S.C. Res. 678, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (Nov. 29, 1990). 
109 See PETERS, supra note 87, at 21 (describing the current war by the United 
States against the Taliban’s drug trafficking); Ferran, supra note 20 (reporting 
statements by President Karzai that al Qaeda was driven out of Afghanistan in 
2001). 
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authorities in maintaining security in Kabul and surrounding 
areas.”110  
 
3.2. The Failed State Doctrine 
The situation in Afghanistan is somewhat unique in that it can 
be argued that Afghanistan has some of the hallmarks of a failed 
state.  A failed state is a state that lacks a functioning political 
decision-making process and fails to “exercise meaningful control 
over its borders or territory.”111  At present, there is no failed state 
doctrine in international law with respect to use of force.  This is 
most likely the result of the inherent difficulties in promulgating 
such a doctrine.112  However, a failed state designation, or lack 
thereof, is beside the point for the purposes of the use of force in 
Afghanistan.  Regardless of whether a state has officially “failed” 
or not, characteristics of that state’s leader can still be examined to 
determine whether he or she is authorized to allow a military 
invasion in his or her state.  The difficulties of having a system that 
rests on a particular definition of a controversial term, such as failed 
state, are many.  Attempts to regulate torture, for instance, aptly 
demonstrate such difficulties.  The word torture is so difficult to 
define that any laws that prohibit the use of torture are subject to 
widely varying interpretation, no matter how extensive the 
definition.  The resulting inconsistency has led to widespread 
abuses worldwide.113 
Thus, for the purposes of allowing a foreign military to make 
war in a state, the decision should not turn on whether that state 
has officially been classified as a failed state.  Whether an arguably 
failed state can be invaded and held accountable for the actions of 
rebels or terrorists within its territory remains unclear under either 
 
110 Jaume Saura, Some Remarks on the Use of Force Against Terrorism in 
Contemporary International Law and the Role of the Security Council, 26 LOY. L.A. INT’L 
& COMP. L. REV. 7, 22 (2003). 
111 Ben N. Dunlap, State Failure and the Use of Force in the Age of Global Terror, 
27 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 453, 469 (2004). 
112 See id. at 470 (“State failure has no legal meaning under international law.  
States have legal personality that outlives any one regime or government, and 
their status cannot be terminated by other states.  Moreover, the criteria for 
statehood are interpreted quite flexibly.”). 
113 See generally THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB (Karen J. 
Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds. 2005) (compiling the Bush Administration’s 
legal memoranda which supported the use of torture). 
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the Nicaragua or Tadic standards.114  This underscores the 
importance of having legitimate rulers in place before authorizing 
the use of military force in the territories of such states.  This 
practical focus should minimize legal loopholes and add 
legitimacy to any unilateral invasion of a state that may be 
harboring terrorists. 
4. THE UNITED STATES’ INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN 
In order to properly assess the legitimacy of utilizing the 
consent doctrine as justification for America’s continued war in 
Afghanistan, a review of how Hamid Karzai came into power there 
is instructive.  In 2001—in direct response to the September 11th 
attacks—the United States invaded Afghanistan under the 
operation referred to as Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).115  
President George W. Bush articulated the military objectives of the 
United States in Afghanistan both in his September 20th Address 
to a Joint Session of Congress and his October 7th address to the 
country.  As previously stated, the three main goals of OEF were:  
“[1] the destruction of terrorist training camps and infrastructure 
within Afghanistan, [2] the capture of Al Qaeda and Taliban 
leaders, and [3] the cessation of terrorist activities in 
Afghanistan.”116 
Moving quickly, the United States teamed up with the 
Northern Alliance—a coalition of Afghan militias opposed to the 
Taliban regime—to remove the Taliban from Kabul within three 
weeks of the October 7, 2001 invasion.117  Per prior U.S. custom, the 
United States stated that it did not desire to remain a de facto 
power.  Instead, it helped facilitate a new interim government out 
of whole cloth—the Interim Authority.  Meetings between the U.N. 
 
114 See O’Connell, supra note 22, at 449–50 (noting that applying the 
prevailing Tadic test to a failed state is less clear, but the “better argument” is that 
if a state is unable to control terrorist activities in its territory, a state may use 
force in self-defense against attacks originating in the failed state). 
115 See Bush Speech (Oct. 7, 2001), supra note 44 (announcing military strikes 
against al Qaeda terrorist training camps and Taliban military installations of the 
Taliban regime in Afghanistan “to disrupt the use of Afghanistan as a terrorist 
base of operations, and to attack the military capability of the Taliban regime”). 
116 Supra text accompanying note 68. 
117 See Harris, supra note 8, at 48 (noting that the United States allied with the 
Northern Alliance and took control of Kabul by November 2001); Koh, supra note 
8, at 1489 (characterizing an “extraordinarily swift and successful military 
campaign to oust the Taliban and restore democracy” in Afghanistan).  
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and expatriate groups in Germany decided that Hamid Karzai 
would lead the Interim Authority, which “shall be the repository of 
Afghan sovereignty.”118  This became known as the Bonn 
Agreement and was signed on December 5, 2001.119  Thus, before 
the conclusion of 2001, it appeared the Bonn Agreement and the 
Interim Authority restored sovereignty to Afghanistan.  The 
Taliban were driven from Kabul, and a new interim leader was 
abruptly installed in their place.  But to refer to Karzai as the leader 
of Afghanistan is misleading.  The reality was—and still is—far 
different. 
4.1. Hamid Karzai’s Involvement with the Mujahedin 
To understand the extent of Karzai’s authority and leadership 
(or lack thereof), it is useful to understand how and why he was 
chosen to become the interim leader.  In 1979, the former Soviet 
Union invaded Afghanistan.  Under the Reagan administration, 
the United States applied the time-tested “enemy of my enemy is 
my friend” approach to international relations, and subsequently 
decided to fund the rebellion in Afghanistan.120  Specifically, the 
CIA funded the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), or 
essentially the Pakistani version of the CIA.121  It was in the CIA-
funded ISI alliance that the idea of “jihad” was invoked to 
motivate rebellious militants against the “secular communists.”122  
It was not difficult to motivate certain angry, devout Muslims or to 
convince them to view the Soviets as unholy, rebel invaders of 
their land.  In short, “the U.S. allowed the use of Islamic religious 
doctrine and propaganda to galvanize groups of Muslims in order 
to fight America’s war against the Soviets.”123 
 
118 Harris, supra note 8, at 49 (quoting Agreement on Provisional 
Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent 
Government Institutions, U.N. Doc. S/2001/1154 (Dec. 5, 2001)). 
119 See id. at 49 (referring to the December 5, 2001 agreement as “the Bonn 
Agreement”).  
120 See Zack Hofstad, Do Unalienable Rights Apply to All?  Extreme Shari’a Law 
and How United States Foreign Policy Towards Iran and Afghanistan Has Fueled Its 
Spread, 6 REGENT J. INT’L L. 191, 216–17 (2008) (describing the United States’ 
Pakistan-centered response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan). 
121 See id. at 215–16 (noting that the CIA funded the ISI). 
122 Id.  
123 Id. at 216. 
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A  radical group of jihadist fighters, “[t]he mujahedin, or holy 
warriors,” emerged from the CIA-ISI alliance.124  The mujahedin 
believed in “jihad and the rifle alone:  no negotiations, no 
conferences, and no dialogues.”125  In total, somewhere between 
10,000–80,000 mujahedin were trained by the CIA-funded ISI to 
fight against the Soviets during the 1980s.126  Hamid Karzai was 
one of them.127 
4.2.  Problems After the Fall of the Taliban 
By December 2001 the Interim Authority was specifically 
established in Afghanistan to take over and temporarily be in 
command.  Karzai, a former mujahedin warrior, was only 
supposed to be the leader for the period before an official 
Constitution was drafted, a task mandated to be completed within 
eighteen months.128 
The initial idea was for Karzai to form a legitimate government 
in Afghanistan.129  That has failed to materialize.  “The Karzai 
regime has little authority over most of Afghanistan.”130  Indeed, 
after nearly a decade since Karzai took over, his authority remains 
as tenuous as ever:  “every aspect of the intelligence community’s 
work in Afghanistan is being called into question.  According to a 
report, made public—remarkably—by Major General Michael 
Flynn, military intelligence has been ‘ignorant’ about the local 
power structures in combat areas, imperiling U.S. troops on the 
ground.”131  There are local power structures in the combat areas 
 
124 Id. 
125 Id. (quoting MAHMOOD MAMDANI, GOOD MUSLIM, BAD MUSLIM 127 (2004)). 
126 Id. 
127 See President Hamid Karzai, THE EMBASSY OF AFGHANISTAN, 
http://www.embassyofafghanistan.org/president.html (last visited Nov. 17, 
2011) (detailing Karzai’s involvement with the mujahedin in Pakistan during the 
1980s and his subsequent involvement with the mujahedin government in 
Afghanistan during the 1990s). 
128 See Thomas H. Johnson, The Prospects for Post-Conflict Afghanistan: A Call of 
the Sirens to the Country’s Troubled Past, 5 STRATEGIC INSIGHTS (2006), 
http://www.nps.edu/Academics/centers/ccc/publications/OnlineJournal/2006
/Feb/johnsonFeb06.pdf (assessing Afghanistan’s current politics, development 
and stability).  
129 See Harris, supra note 8, at 49 (describing how U.S. presence in 
Afghanistan is a form of occupation).  
130 Mark A. Drumbl, Rights, Culture, and Crime: The Role of Rule of Law for the 
Women of Afghanistan, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 349, 360 (2004). 
131 Klein, supra note 71, at 31. 
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because Karzai does not have actual power over them.  Yet, the 
United States continues to conduct war in Afghanistan under the 
authority and approval provided by Karzai, the man who lacks 
power and control.  Is this specter of authority sufficient to satisfy 
international law? 
After a cursory examination of the situation, it would appear 
so.  The United States and the U.N. both recognize Karzai as the 
leader of Afghanistan.132  Recognition is the “formal 
acknowledgment by existing States of the normal political 
consequences flowing from the status of the entity that is 
recognized.”133  Recognition can legitimize a de facto leadership 
situation.134  Furthermore, U.N. admission can equal recognition.135  
Thus, at first glance, America and the U.N.’s approval would 
appear to conclude the inquiry—Karzai is the leader of 
Afghanistan.  But a deeper inquiry into the matter reveals 
otherwise.  Karzai was forcefully imposed on the Afghan people, 
and militarily protected, in large part, by America.  Moreover, by 
most accounts, al Qaeda, the terrorist group responsible for 9/11, 
has long since left the region.136  Osama bin Laden, found in 
Pakistan, not Afghanistan, is dead.137  Thus, America’s war in 
Afghanistan is against the Taliban, a group who never attacked 
America.  It is here that the United States’ continued presence in 
Afghanistan is especially troubling.  Does an imputed leader such 
as Karzai have the legitimacy to authorize such a use of force in 
“his” state against a foe that never attacked America? 
An affirmative answer would set a dangerous precedent for the 
world.  Any nation, from China to Venezuela, could first invade a 
 
132 See, e.g., Pamela Constable & Joshua Partlow, Karzai Declared Winner of 
Afghan Election a Day After Rival Quits, WASH. POST, Nov. 3, 2009, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/02 
/AR2009110203455.html (noting that U.N., U.S., and European officials 
congratulated Karzai on his reelection to the Afghan Presidency). 
133 JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 539–40 
(2d ed. 2006). 
134 See id. at 540 (noting that the effect of a “collective acknowledgement of 
status (or its collective denial)” is sometimes “to legitimize a de facto situation.”). 
135 See id. (“[T]he collective acknowledgment of status that might have been 
effected by a system of organized collective recognition is achieved by admission 
to the United Nations . . . .”). 
136 See Ferran, supra note 20 (noting Karzai’s statement that al Qaeda is no 
longer in Afghanistan, having been “driven out . . . in 2001”). 
137 See, e.g., Wilson et al., supra note 5 (reporting the death of Osama bin 
Laden in a U.S. raid).  
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country, then have a leader installed who was subsequently 
protected by its military, and then on the newly installed leader’s 
apparent authority, remain militarily active in that nation, killing 
the native people for more than a decade without any international 
legal repercussions.  How would the United States react if China 
did this in Taiwan?138  America’s continued war in Afghanistan 
supposedly legitimized by Karzai’s blessing is a very dangerous 
precedent that will likely be an increasingly common phenomenon, 
as “[t]raditional state v [sic] state war is largely a relic.”139 
4.3. The Law of Occupation 
Though Afghanistan is a particularly useful example in many 
ways, it is important to note that it is not the perfect example of the 
consent doctrine.  That is because many of the legitimacy problems 
regarding Karzai, which will be discussed below, arise in a context 
where America is already militarily present in Afghanistan.  In 
more general terms, the cleanest example would be to assess the 
legitimacy of a leader to determine consent before a military 
invasion takes place.  Here, America invaded Afghanistan in 
October 2001, before Karzai took office.  Thus, some discussion 
regarding the law of occupation is necessary before proceeding 
with Afghanistan as an example of a state with a leader who may 
not have the requisite legitimacy to authorize the foreign use of 
force. 
The term “occupying power” has a specific definition under 
the various international laws and agreements that comprise the 
Law of Armed Conflict.140  “Territory is considered occupied when 
it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army.”141  
 
138 This idea may not be as far-fetched as it seems.  The world is no longer 
unipolar, and China very well may be able to persuade the U.N. to recognize a 
leader of a country that is not a real leader in any practical sense of the word.  
America’s continued war in Afghanistan could serve as a model to China and 
others. 
139 Guiora, supra note 4, at 3.  
140 The Law of Armed Conflict is comprised of the Hague Conventions of 
1899 and 1907, in addition to the four Geneva Conventions of 1864, 1906, 1929, 
and 1949, as well as the Additional Protocols of 1977 and 2005.  See, e.g., William 
H. Taft, The Law of Armed Conflict After 9/11: Some Salient Features, 28 YALE J. INT'L 
L. 319–20 (2003) (arguing in favor of the Law of Armed Conflict’s appropriateness 
as a “legal framework for regulating the use of force in the war on terrorism”). 
141 Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, art. 42, 
Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, U.N.T.S. 539 (outlining the circumstances in which 
territory is considered occupied). 
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Moreover, “occupation extends only to the territory where such 
authority has been established and can be exercised.”142  It is 
important to note, however, that: 
[T]he degree of control that the foreign military force 
exercises over specific territory may ebb and flow, making 
such broad tests of occupational authority difficult to apply 
. . . .  As Eyal Benvenisti notes, however, the modern 
concept of occupation, as exemplified by U.N. Security 
Council Resolution 1483, only contemplates a temporary 
term of authority by the foreign power over the occupied 
territories . . . .143 
Thus, with respect to America’s involvement in Afghanistan, it 
may be argued that America is simply an occupying power and 
therefore does not need the approval of Karzai to continue its 
current military operations. 
Such a decision would be premature, however.  First, even 
assuming, arguendo, that America is merely the occupying power, 
it is only supposed to have control where “such authority has been 
established and can be exercised.”144  Much of the fighting is 
occurring in parts of Afghanistan in which the local warlords and 
the Taliban, not the United States or Karzai, are in control.145  No 
clear authority has been established.  This argument resonates with 
some scholars so strongly that is leads them to conclude that 
because of this, Karzai cannot possibly provide legitimate consent 
for war in Afghanistan.146 
Second, America is not merely an “occupying power,” as it is 
doing far more than just occupying Afghanistan.  The fighting has 
dramatically increased over time, and in the first few months of 
2010 America added 30,000 more troops to Afghanistan.147  Such a 
 
142 Id.  
143 Richard Morgan, The Law At War: Counterinsurgency Operations and the Use 
of Indigenous Legal Institutions, 33 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 55, 62 (2010). 
144 Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, supra note 
141, art. 42 (referring to the definition of an occupied territory). 
145 See Drumbl, supra note 130, at 360 (explaining that the Karzai government 
“has little authority over most of Afghanistan”); Klein, supra note 71 (quoting 
Major General Michael Flynn as stating that military intelligence has been 
“ignorant” of Afghanistan’s local power structures). 
146 See Saura, supra note 110, at 22 (arguing that the U.S. presence in 
Afghanistan is not authorized by Resolution 1373).  
147 See Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Helene Cooper, Obama Adds Troops, but Maps 
Exit Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com 
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dramatic increase in troops, which (for reasons that will be 
explained later) resulted only after a yearlong wait for Karzai’s 
approval, changes the character of any previous occupation into a 
military offensive.  Since this influx of troops, this has been, in a 
sense, a whole new war.  This new war makes Afghanistan, though 
not historically obvious, a particularly useful example of the 
consent doctrine and the requisite authority a leader needs to 
authorize the foreign use of force.  It is in that vein that Karzai’s 
leadership will be further explored. 
5. HOW AMERICA CAME TO RELY ON  
THE CONSENT DOCTRINE IN AFGHANISTAN 
The United States invaded Afghanistan in 2001 in search of 
those responsible for 9/11—al Qaeda.  Since the Taliban 
government of Afghanistan was protecting or harboring al Qaeda 
members, the United States claimed self-defense as authorization 
for the war.148  In reality, the United States had little other choice 
under international law.  As it has been discussed, the U.N. 
Security Council did not authorize the use of force in 
Afghanistan.149  The invasion on its face violated Article 2(4) of the 
U.N. Charter, prohibiting any use of force that threatens the 
territorial integrity of political independence of any state.  This left 
the United States claiming self-defense against a foe, the Taliban, 
which never attacked it. 
This is the basic underpinning of the Bush Doctrine of pre-
emptive war.  “[A]s a matter of common sense and self-defense, 
America will act against such emerging threats before they are 
fully formed.”150  In a sense, the United States announced it had the 
 
/2009/12/02/world/asia/02prexy.html?pagewanted=all (discussing President 
Obama’s deployment of additional troops to Afghanistan).  
148 See Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Terrorists, Pub. L. No. 
107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (authorizing the use of force against those who 
planned the attacks of September 11, 2001); Bush Announces Opening of Attacks, 
CNN (Oct. 7, 2001), http://articles.cnn.com/2001-10-
07/us/ret.attack.bush_1_qaeda-targets-al-kandahar?_s=PM:US (discussing the 
commencement of U.S. air strikes in Afghanistan in response to Afghanistan’s 
refusal to “close terrorist training camps, turn over al Qaeda leaders and return 
international citizens detained in Afghanistan”). 
149 Further, the Security Council also did not authorize the indefinite use of 
force in Afghanistan, long after al Qaeda had left and bin Laden had been killed. 
150 OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA (Sept. 2002), available at http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002.  
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authority to strike whomever, whenever, if, in the sole opinion of 
the United States, any country somehow posed a danger or 
potential danger, or harbored someone who posed a potential 
danger to United States.151  Many scholars, in the United States and 
abroad, have criticized the Bush Doctrine, as it marked a sharp 
departure from international law governing the use of force.152  
Though some accepted the idea of invading a foreign country to go 
after terrorists that attacked their country, they would not accept 
that notion indefinitely.153  How long can the United States stay in 
Afghanistan and claim self-defense against al Qaeda? 
According to Karzai himself, “al Qaeda was driven out of 
Afghanistan in 2001.”154  In fact, when bin Laden was found and 
killed in Pakistan in April 2011, it was discovered that he had been 
operating and running al Qaeda from that base camp in Pakistan 
for at least the past five years.155  Thus, from as early as 2002, the 
United States has not been fighting al Qaeda with its war in 
Afghanistan.  It has been fighting against the Taliban, making 
claims of self-defense dubious. 
America recognized early on that since al Qaeda was largely 
absent from Afghanistan, the legality of its war there was 
increasingly tenuous.  As a result, the United States quickly 
decided to hold free and fair democratic elections in Afghanistan 
by 2004.  This was not borne out of altruism or a strong desire to 
see the Afghan people have a free society.  Rather, the United 
States needed a legitimate and legal reason to continue making war 
in Afghanistan, against a foe that never attacked it.  America 
 
151 See Peter Baker, Bush to Restate Terror Strategy, WASH. POST, Mar. 16, 2006, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/03/15 
/AR2006031502297.html (reiterating President Bush’s strategy to preemptively 
strike the terrorists).  
152 See Jane Gilliland Dalton, The United States National Security Strategy: 
Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow, 52 NAVAL L. REV. 60, 60 (2005) (noting that 
President Bush’s National Security Strategy contains “four major themes with 
significant international law implications”). 
153 See MCDONNELL, supra note 23, at 261 (discussing attempts to limit the 
right of self-defense in an effort to avoid further violence, and discussing other 
potentially analogous scenarios, including whether the United States could justify 
its attack on Nicaragua with a self-defense argument); O’Connell, supra note 21, at 
889 (“At the outset, [the operation] did indeed meet the conditions of lawful self-
defense, but later stages of the operation may have gone beyond the bounds of 
proportionality.”). 
154 Ferran, supra note 20. 
155 See Wilson et al., supra note 5 (detailing the events surrounding Osama bin 
Laden’s death). 
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needed Karzai to be elected by the people, so his consent to the war 
could create at least the illusion of legitimacy for its continued 
invasion and active military presence in Afghanistan.156 
5.1. The 2004 Afghanistan Election 
In 2004 the United States announced that Afghanistan was 
going to have a fair and democratic election.157  The seemingly 
democratic system installed in Afghanistan by the Interim 
Authority called for an elected President of Afghanistan to serve a 
five-year term.158  In order to avoid a run-off, the winner of the 
general election in Afghanistan also had to have more than fifty 
percent of the popular vote.159  Thus, heading into the 2004 election 
America’s primary focus was ensuring, at all costs, that Hamid 
Karzai received more than fifty percent of the vote. 
Those costs included an unfair democratic process.  By all 
accounts, the 2004 election appeared to be rigged.160  From the 
beginning, the United States made sure the message was out that 
Karzai was supposed to win, by ensuring that Karzai received 
“over 75% of all state TV and radio coverage” since campaigning 
began in late 2004.161  On the state-controlled Afghan radio—a key 
medium in Afghanistan—Karzai received eighty-five percent of all 
 
156 There is mounting evidence of this as more details have emerged from 
Karzai’s most recent “election.”  One example is his recent pronouncement that 
American troops need to be actively engaged in Afghanistan until at least 2020.  
See Keating, supra note 102. 
157 See Ahto Lobjakas, Afghanistan: NATO, U.S. Will Not Accept Full 
Responsibility for Fairness of Election, RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY (Aug. 16, 
2004), http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1054335.html (discussing the U.S. 
insistence that the elections must be “free and fair,” but that the ultimate 
responsibility rests with Afghanistan). 
158 See id. (discussing the months leading up to Afghanistan’s 2004 
presidential election); see also President Hamid Karzai, supra note 127 (noting that 
upon election in 2004, Karzai’s first term was slated to last for five years). 
159 See Sayed Salahuddin, Factbox: Profiles of Key Afghan Presidential Candidates 
(August 19, 2009), REUTERS, available at http://www.reuters.com/article 
/2009/08/19/us-afghanistan-election-profiles-sb-idUSTRE57I1NJ20090819 
(discussing the numerous presidential candidates in Afghanistan, and the need to 
win more than 50% of the vote to avoid a run-off). 
160 See Associated Press, Fraud Allegations Double in Afghan Election (Aug. 30, 
2009), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/32617636 (underscoring the 2,096 
allegations of fraud and voter intimidation received by the complaints 
commission). 
161 North, supra note 91. 
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the editorial coverage of candidates.162  There was also no “check” 
on Afghanistan’s state-controlled media, as in America’s 
democracy.  There was no Saturday Night Live television program 
making fun of the media-loving Barack Obama, or giving Sarah 
Palin a chance to defend herself and be funny.163  How can there be 
a legitimate democratic election if the key tenets of democracy are 
disregarded in the electoral process? 
More specifically, the 2004 election was marred by an indelible 
ink scandal that tainted the vote count.  In an effort to prevent 
fraud and ensure an accurate vote count, the election polls for the 
2004 Afghanistan Presidential election required each person to dip 
their finger in indelible ink as they cast their vote.164  However, 
numerous Afghans, including at least two presidential candidates, 
complained that the ink used at the polling stations came off far 
too easily, thereby allowing one person to vote multiple times.165  
One presidential candidate Ramazan Badhardost, was so upset by 
the fungible nature of the ink that he urged the Independent 
Election Commission (IEC) to cancel the entire election.166  Said Mr. 
Badhardost, “this is not an election, this is a comedy.”167 
It is upon that basis, a farce of an election under the veil of a 
fair democratic process, that the United States garnered 
authorization from an “elected leader” to increase its military 
involvement in Afghanistan.  The international community should 
be careful about accepting this as the model for compliance with 
international law. 
 
162 North, supra note 91. 
163 See Afghanistan: Journalist Given Death Sentence for ‘Blasphemy’, RADIO FREE 
EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY (Jan. 23, 2008), 
http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1079389.html (illustrating the extent to 
which the Afghani media is controlled through an account of a journalist 
sentenced to death for an article considered blasphemous).  “Afghan media 
outlets have sprung up in large numbers since the ouster of the hard-line Taliban 
regime in late 2001, although press freedoms frequently run up against official 
obstacles or opposition from conservative forces that include the clergy.”  Id. 
164 See Foreign Staff, Afghanistan Election: ‘Indelible Ink’ Washes Off Voters’ 
Fingers, TELEGRAPH (London), Aug. 20, 2009, http://www.telegraph.co.uk 
/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/6061343/Afghanistan-election-indelible-
ink-washes-off-voters-fingers.html (describing the ink as a less than satisfactory 
safeguard against voter fraud due to its potential to be removed). 
165 Id.  See also Afghan Poll Hailed as a ‘Success’, BBC NEWS (Aug. 20, 2009, 5:46 
PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8212306.stm (noting a presidential candidate’s 
complaint that the ink easily washed off). 
166 Id. (noting that Bashardost “call[ed] on authorities to stop the election”). 
167 Id. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2011
04 WILLIAMS.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 11/30/2011  8:25 PM 
604 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 33:2 
5.2.  Aftermath of the 2004 Election 
After Karzai was elected President in 2004, nothing 
immediately changed.  He still lacked power outside of Kabul and 
the drug warlords were still the actual rulers of Afghanistan.168  Yet 
the United States continued to fight a war against the Taliban 
under Karzai’s approval.  As the war continued on, public support 
in America and abroad began to wane.169  The United States was 
continuing to use force against a former government of 
Afghanistan.  The more years the United States was removed from 
9/11, the less Bush’s preemptive war doctrine seemed to apply.  By 
the arrival of the 2008 U.S. presidential election, presidential 
hopeful Barack Obama campaigned on a promise to change the 
way America fought the war on terror.170 
While this overall mantra of change may have won Obama the 
election by a landslide, it did not promise scaling back the war in 
Afghanistan.  Quite the contrary, as Obama’s first year in office 
drew to a close, General McChrystal and others were telling the 
President that he needed to vastly increase the number of 
American troops in Afghanistan.171  2009 also marked the 
conclusion of Karzai’s first term as “elected” President of 
Afghanistan.  Once again America had a great incentive to ensure 
Karzai remained in office because it wanted to add tens of 
thousands of more troops to fight the war in Afghanistan.  What 
 
168 See Harris, supra note 8, at 48–56 (describing the interim Afghan 
government that was created during the U.S. occupation of Afghanistan, and the 
lack of authority that it possessed outside of the capital); Koh, supra note 8, at 
1489–90 (citing the insufficient allocation of resources to geographical areas 
outside of the capital as the reason for Karzai’s lack of control).  
169 See Jeffrey M. Jones, In U.S., More Optimism About Iraq, Less About 
Afghanistan, GALLUP (Mar. 18, 2009), http://www.gallup.com/poll/116920 
/optimism-iraq-less-afghanistan.aspx (charting a decline in American optimism 
toward military efforts in Afghanistan, but noting that the majority of Americans 
still support the war in Afghanistan); Europeans Rally Against War in Afghanistan, 
JERUSALEM POST, Sept. 20, 2008, http://www.jpost.com/International 
/Article.aspx?id=115063 (characterizing heightened unpopularity of the war in 
Afghanistan through European antiwar protests). 
170 See Jake Tapper, Obama Delivers Bold Speech About War on Terror, ABC 
NEWS (Aug. 1, 2007), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/story?id=3434573&page=1 
(providing an overview of Barack Obama’s campaign initiatives pertaining to the 
U.S. war on terror). 
171 See Schmitt and Shanker, supra note 81 (describing a defense report 
submitted by a U.S. general recommending deployment of more U.S. troops to 
Afghanistan in order to bolster low confidence and defeat an increasingly “savvy” 
insurgency). 
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was true in 2004 was even truer in 2009—America needed legal 
justification for the war, and without seeing any other legal basis 
for being there, it needed consent from a legitimate leader.  
Unfortunately for the United States and the continued legitimacy 
of the use of force under international law, the 2009 Afghanistan 
Presidential elections did not produce such a result. 
5.3. The 2009 Afghanistan Election 
This 2009 election drew even more questions and complaints 
than those from 2004.  This time one particular challenger to Karzai 
emerged, Abdullah Abdullah.  The election was held on August 20, 
2009.  After the initial votes came in, Abdullah and Karzai both 
claimed victory.172  “As far as my campaign is concerned, I am in 
the lead, and that’s despite the rigging which has taken place,” 
Abdullah told the Associated Press.173 
By August 30, Abdullah’s contentions about the election’s 
fairness were proving true.  There were more than 550 documented 
specific and major allegations of fraud by August 30, just ten days 
after the election.174  “The spike indicates just how pervasive ballot 
box stuffing and voter intimidation may have been during the 
country’s Aug. 20 vote, threatening the legitimacy of the 
election.”175 
After the votes were counted, it only got worse.  By October, 
“U.N. backed fraud investigators . . . threw out nearly a third of . . . 
Karzai’s votes,” over one million total, because they were 
fraudulent.176  That left Karzai short of the fifty percent majority he 
 
172 Associated Press, Hamid Karzai, Rival Abdullah Abdullah Both Claim Victory 




174 See Afghanistan Election Marred by More than 550 Fraud Allegations, N.Y 
DAILY NEWS, Aug. 30, 2009, http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/2009 
/08/30/2009-08-30_afghanistan_election_marred_by_more_than_550_fraud 
_allegations.html (describing the allegations against Karzai for corrupt election 
practices and attributing the decline of Karazai’s popularity to the resurgence of 
violence and his recruitment of former warlords to gain votes). 
175 Id. 
176 Nearly a Third of Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s Votes Thrown Out by UN 
Backed Fraud Investigators, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Oct. 19, 2009, 
http://articles.nydailynews.com/2009-10-19/news/17935872_1_karzai-
campaign-spokesman-independent-election-commission-karzai-supporters.  The 
U.N. investigators were specifically assigned to watch over the 2009 election in an 
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needed to win in Afghanistan and avoid a run-off against 
Abdullah.  This represented the worst case scenario for America—
proof that the elections were rigged and that Karzai was not the 
rightful, legitimate leader of Afghanistan.  However, these U.N. 
backed investigators were only there to report the findings; it was 
up to the IEC to announce the final results or commence with the 
run-off.177 
At the same time, Americans were dying every day in 
Afghanistan at an increasingly alarming rate.178  American generals 
urged the Obama administration to send more troops, but the 
White House refused, claiming that “no decision on sending more 
U.S. troops to Afghanistan would be made before the election crisis 
is resolved . . . .”179  In other words, “[a] decision had been held up 
in part because the blatant rigging of the August election 
jeopardized the legitimacy of Karzai’s government, which has been 
an important prerequisite for U.S. counterinsurgency strategy.”180  
As such, the stage was set for the IEC to announce the run-off.  
However, that never happened. 
Every member of the IEC was appointed by Karzai.181  For two 
straight weeks, the IEC made no pronouncement and gave no 
indication that any runoff was coming.  Not surprisingly, after two 
weeks of inaction by the IEC, Abdullah had enough.  Abdullah 
officially put an end to the charade masquerading as an election by 
 
attempt to avoid the scandals associated with the 2004 Afghanistan presidential 
election.  Afghanistan Election Marred by More than 550 Fraud Allegations, supra note 
174.  Unfortunately, they only served to verify the magnitude of the fraud in the 
2009 election.  U.N. Official: 'Widespread Fraud' in Afghanistan Election, 
FOXNEWS.COM (Oct. 11, 2009), http://www.foxnews.com/world/2009 
/10/11/official-widespread-fraud-afghanistan-election. 
177 Id. 
178 See, e.g., Afghanistan Coalition Military Fatalities By Year, ICAUSALITIES, 
http://icasualties.org/ (diagraming American deaths per year in Afghanistan, 
which include 98 deaths in 2006, 117 deaths in 2007, 155 deaths in 2008, and 317 
deaths in 2009). 
179 Nearly a Third of Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s Votes Thrown Out by UN 
Backed Fraud Investigators, supra note 176. 
180 Kevin Whitelaw, Karzai ‘Victory’ Puts Spotlight on U.S. Troop Decision, NPR 
(Nov. 2, 2009), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId 
=120016883. 
181 See Brian Kates, Afghan Election Commission Declares Hamid Karzai Winner, 
N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Nov. 2, 2009, http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world 
/2009/11/02/2009-11-02_afghan_election_commission_declares_hamid 
_karzai_winner_of_presidential_election.html (reporting on the IEC’s declaration 
that Karzai won the presidential election by default). 
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withdrawing, stating the ballot “would not have been fair” and 
accusing the IEC of bias.182  Abdullah further said that a fair 
election was “impossible.”183  Even Karzai admitted there was 
widespread “fraud” in the election.184 
Obama administration officials have repeatedly expressed 
concerns about the credibility of the Karzai government.185  Obama 
himself admitted “the process was messy, but was ‘in accordance’ 
with Afghan law.”186  This description rang hollow and exposed 
America’s true feelings about the situation in Afghanistan—it 
needed Karzai to win regardless of the cost.  To wit, the day after 
Abdullah’s withdrawal, the IEC declared Karzai the winner and 
President of Afghanistan.187 
Less than a month later, President Obama, with newly elected 
President Karzai’s blessing, ordered more than 30,000 additional 
American troops to fight in Afghanistan.188 
6. KARZAI IS NOT THE LEGITIMATE LEADER OF AFGHANISTAN 
In order for the United States to utilize the consent doctrine as a 
legal means for making war in Afghanistan, it needs consent from 
the leader of Afghanistan.  Despite the rigged elections, Karzai is 
recognized as the leader of Afghanistan.  Recognition is the 
“formal acknowledgment by existing States of the normal political 
consequences flowing from the status of the entity that is 
recognized.”189  Recognition legitimizes a de facto leadership 




184 See Ferran, supra note 20 (reporting that though Karzai represented that 
“the election, as a whole, was good and free and democratic[,]” Karzai 
nonetheless admitted to instances of electoral fraud). 
185 See Kates, supra note 181 (noting that, in an effort to increase Karzai’s 
credibility, various U.S. government officials had pressed Karzai to consent to a 
run-off during the controversial 2009 Afghan election). 
186 Whitelaw, supra note 180. 
187 Id. 
188 Obama, supra note 7. 
189 CRAWFORD, supra note 133, at 539–40. 
190 See id. at 540 (noting that the effect of a “collective acknowledgement of 
status (or its collective denial)” is often “to legitimize a de facto situation”). 
191 See id. (“[T]he collective acknowledgment of status that might have been 
effected by a system of organized collective recognition is achieved by admission 
to the United Nations . . . .”). 
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For example, Karzai is the recognized leader of Afghanistan by the 
United States and the U.N.192  At first glance this would seem to 
end the inquiry.  But it should not, because Karzai has little actual 
power, and only remains in power through fraudulent elections 
and support from the invading state to which he provides consent.  
Because of all of the following, Hamid Karzai is not the legitimate 
leader of Afghanistan, and therefore cannot legalize America’s 
military intervention there.193 
6.1. He Was Appointed 
From 2001 through 2004, Karzai was only the Interim 
Authority, specially appointed and not elected by the people.  The 
fact that the U.N. and expatriate groups in Germany decided that 
Hamid Karzai would lead the Interim Authority raises suspicions 
about the legitimacy of Karzai’s rule.  Had Karzai been elected by 
the Afghan people in 2001 in a fair and just election, such a result 
would have favored legitimacy.  But that is not what happened.  
The result is an appointed leader, selected by a combination of 
outside parties who are not all too familiar with the region. 
6.2. For Years Karzai Maintained Only Temporary Status 
It seems oxymoronic that by definition a temporary, or interim, 
authority figure could have the power to invite in the military of 
another state to make war there.  Yet from 2001 through 2004, that 
is precisely what happened.  Worse still, in the case of Afghanistan, 
that temporary authority, Karzai, was put in place (in part) by the 
U.S. military.  The argument that America has the authority to 
militarily intervene because the pro-tem interim leader America 
installed consents is as circular as it is illogical.  This behavior is 
also contrary to the U.N. Charter’s overall mantra commanding 
 
192 See, e.g., Statement By His Excellency Hamid Karzai at the 61st Session of 
the U.N. G.A. (Sept. 20, 2006), available at 
http://www.un.org/webcast/ga/61/pdfs/afghantistan-e.pdf (referring in a U.N. 
document to Hamid Karzai as “His Excellency Hamid Karzai President of the 
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan); Hamid Karazi Profile, ACADEMY OF ACHIEVEMENT, 
http://www.achievement.org/autodoc/page/kar0pro-1 (last updated Feb. 2, 
2005) (recognizing Hamid Karzai as the president of Afghanistan). 
193 There may be, in fact, no sole current leader of Afghanistan. 
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states to refrain from unilaterally using force to promote their own 
self-interests.194 
6.3. Karzai Lacks Actual Control or Power Over the Region 
As noted, Karzai’s temporary status changed when he was 
“elected” in 2004 and 2009.  Yet Karzai still lacks control and 
exercises little power over the country he is supposedly leading.  
From the beginning, “the authority of the interim governing 
administration was circumscribed, state institutions were virtually 
non-existent, and the Interim Authority exercised almost no 
authority outside of the capital.”195  Karzai’s lack of control and 
authority in Afghanistan has continued to the present.  “The Karzai 
regime has little authority over most of Afghanistan.  Those who 
exercise authority, such as local warlords, tend to be ultra-
conservative.”196 
“[S]ecurity remains a major concern in that country 
[Afghanistan] and the authority of the transitional government of 
President Hamid Karzai is still being challenged.”197  Current Legal 
Adviser to the U.S. State Department Harold Koh noted that 
“[w]hile Hamid Karzai nominally acts as president of Afghanistan, 
outside of Kabul, much of the country remains under the de facto 
control of warlords and drug lords.”198  Even inside Kabul there is 
chaos.  For example, in July 2011, his most trusted bodyguard 
killed Karzai’s brother.199  In short, Karzai does not and has never 
had control over most of Afghanistan.  He therefore cannot 
legitimately grant access to something over which he does not have 
control. 
Worse still, Karzai’s lack of control is not even debatable, as 
America admits he has no real power or control over Afghanistan.  
For example, in late 2009 Secretary of State Hillary Clinton referred 
 
194 See U.N. Charter, art. 2, para. 3 (“All Members shall settle their 
international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international 
peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.”). 
195 Harris, supra note 8, at 49. 
196 Drumbl, supra note 130, at 360. 
197 Panel Discussion, supra note 8, at 182. 
198 Koh, supra note 8, at 1489. 
199 See Julius Cavendish, Bodyguard Who Killed Karzai’s Brother was Trusted CIA 
Contact, INDEPENDENT (London), July 16, 2011, 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/bodyguard-who-killed-
karzais-brother-was-trusted-cia-contact-2314580.html (noting that the bodyguard 
had been recruited by the Taliban after working closely with U.S. officials). 
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to Afghanistan as a “narco-state” with Karzai’s supposed 
government “plagued by limited capacity and widespread 
corruption.”200  A narco-state is “an area that has been taken over 
and is controlled and corrupted by drug cartels and where law 
enforcement is effectively nonexistent.”201  This presents a situation 
where the invading state admits that the alleged leader has no 
control or authority over invaded Afghanistan, while 
simultaneously relying on the alleged leader’s supposed legitimate 
authority to make war in Afghanistan.  Such a self-fulfilling 
justification for war is fundamentally flawed and illegitimate. 
6.4. Afghanistan’s Judiciary System is Corrupt 
“[I]n every legal system some organ must be competent to 
determine with certainty the subjects of the system. . . .  [The 
States’] determinations must have definitive legal effect.”202  
Without definitive legal recourse and guidance coming from the 
state government, the people will not be effectively governed by 
the state.  In Afghanistan, the corrupt judiciary system is further 
evidence of a lack of legitimate and actual power from an alleged 
leader and government. 
For example, in December 2009, the mayor of Kabul was 
sentenced to four years in prison on corruption charges.203  
Initially, Afghans were thrilled to see the mayor finally have to 
succumb to some rule of law in Afghanistan.  However: 
The very next day, . . . Sahebi [the disgraced mayor] was 
back in the Mayoral Office after a higher court granted him 
bail.  And despite official statements that he is not allowed 
to continue running the capital city, Sahebi did just that for 
nearly a week before resigning on December 13.204   
 
200 Rajiv Chandrasekaran, U.S. Resetting its Relationship with Karzai, WASH. 
POST, Nov. 20, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn 
/content/article/2009/11/19/AR2009111903992.html?hpid=topnews. 
201 Narco-state, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse 
/narco-state (lasted visited Nov. 15, 2011). 
202 CRAWFORD, supra note 133, at 20. 
203 Abubakar Siddique, Weak Judiciary Pushes Some Afghans To Taliban, RADIO 
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Indeed, “[t]he fact that he stayed in office so long astonished 
Afghans . . . it has placed the entire Afghan judiciary under the 
spotlight.”205 
Kabul University Professor Nasrullah Stanekzai agrees that 
“[w]ithout a fundamentally strong judicial system we cannot find 
our way to justice.  And people cannot trust their government.”206  
According to J. Alexander Tier, who oversees Afghanistan and 
Pakistan at the U.S. Institute of Peace, the lack of the alleged 
government’s ability to resolve disputes has done more than just 
put the judiciary in the spotlight.  “The Afghan government will 
not be legitimate if it is not seen to be involved in the resolution of 
disputes; if it is not seen to be involved in justice.”207 
In sum, Karzai is not a legitimate ruler of Afghanistan; 
therefore, the consent doctrine is not a legally viable method to 
justify America’s continued use of force in Afghanistan. 
7. THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES  
OF FIGHTING THIS ILLEGAL WAR 
America should be concerned about setting a troublesome 
precedent with its continued military presence and fighting in 
Afghanistan.  Without any legal justification for the war on terror 
in Afghanistan, America unwittingly opens the door for other 
nations to undertake similar, decade-plus long “self-defense” 
actions that result in thousands of innocent deaths per year, while 
not legally being in self-defense.  Nor do the attacks even have to 
be against the people who attacked the now intruding state.  
Following America’s lead, states may no longer need a U.N. 
Security Council resolution to attack, nor approval from a 
legitimate leader.  Any nation, from North Korea to Iran, could 
first invade a country, then facilitate installation of a leader who 
was subsequently protected by its military, and then on the newly 
installed leader’s apparent authority, continue making war for 
more than a decade without any international legal repercussions.  
The negative consequences of establishing such a precedent should 
not be underestimated. 
In addition, America’s illegal actions allow other nations to 
deflect attention from their own wrongdoings and place the 
 
205 Id. (quoting Kabul University law professor Najeeb Mahmood). 
206 Id. 
207 Id. 
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spotlight squarely on America’s illegal war.  For example, 
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has urged the United Nations 
to open a fact-finding mission into the legality of America’s war in 
Afghanistan.208  This was in 2010, even before bin Laden’s death in 
Pakistan.  By placing the international spotlight on America’s 
illegal war in Afghanistan, Iran takes the spotlight off its somewhat 
suspect uranium expeditions.209 
8. CONCLUSION 
America’s continued war on terror in Afghanistan is somewhat 
of a misnomer.  It is no longer against al Qaeda terrorists but 
against Taliban drug lords.  The war is no longer (if it ever was) a 
self-defense action, as those responsible for the attack, al Qaeda, 
have long since left the region.  This is further evidenced by bin 
Laden’s 2011 death in Pakistan (where he had been living for more 
than 5 years), not Afghanistan.  The continued fighting also fails 
under the scrutiny of Article 51’s elements of necessity and 
proportionality.  With al Qaeda gone and bin Laden dead, 
America’s behavior is neither necessary nor proportional. 
The fighting is also not taking place under the auspices of a 
U.N. Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force.210  
Without a Security Council resolution specifically authorizing the 
continued attacks on the Taliban indefinitely, the only remaining 
way for America to legally continue to use force against the 
Taliban in Afghanistan is through the approval of a legitimate 
 
208 See Barbara Plett, Iran Urges UN Inquiry into Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
BBC NEWS (Apr. 13, 2010), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east 
/8616850.stm (discussing Ahmadinejad’s request for a U.N. fact-finding team to 
investigate the intentions and results of Western military action in Afghanistan 
and Iraq, which coincided with a rise in international tension over Iran’s nuclear 
program). 
209 See id. 
210 Instead, the Security Council has instituted a program, the United Nations 
Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) to promote the Afghani 
government’s recovery efforts.  See Press Release, Security Council, Security 
Council Extends Mandate of United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan to 
Help Promote Government-Led Recovery Efforts, U.N. Press Release SC/9889 
(Mar. 22, 2010), http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/sc9889.doc.htm 
(announcing and describing Resolution 1917 (2010), which realigns UNAMA “to 
assist [Afghanistan’s] Government in the transition to national leadership of the 
country’s recover efforts”).  
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leader of Afghanistan.  It is widely thought, even in America, that 
Karzai is not a legitimate leader of Afghanistan.211 
At this juncture, the war is most likely illegal.  By continuing to 
fight, America loses a significant amount of moral high ground 
and tangible international leverage.  America also unwittingly 
establishes a precarious blueprint for future states to follow.  
Whatever sound (or unsound) reasons American policymakers 
have for continuing the war, its illegality foreshadows a 
destabilizing future. 
 
211 See Chandrasekaran, supra note 200 (detailing the efforts of U.S. officials to 
get Karzai to accede to an election run-off, and implying a lack of American 
confidence in the legitimacy of his position). 
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